The Proper Role of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Title VII Suits by Jackson, Charles C. et al.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 79 Issue 8 
1981 
The Proper Role of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Title 
VII Suits 
Charles C. Jackson 
John H. Matheson 
Thomas J. Pikorski 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, 
Legislation Commons, and the Litigation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Charles C. Jackson, John H. Matheson & Thomas J. Pikorski, The Proper Role of Res Judicata and 
Collateral Estoppel in Title VII Suits, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1485 (1981). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol79/iss8/2 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
THE PROPER ROLE OF RES JUDICATA 
AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN 
TITLE VII SUITS 
Charles C Jackson* 
John H. Matheson** 
Thomas J. Piskorski***t 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 embraces an intricate 
and overlapping array of state and federal enforcement procedures,2 
all designed to eradicate discriminatory employment practices based 
on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.3 In states that have 
not adopted fair employment practices laws, the federal system oper-
ates alone. The complainant must first file with a federal agency, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which will 
investigate the charge.4 If the EEOC finds reasonable cause to be-
lieve the allegation, it may, after unsuccessfully using informal con-
ciliation to resolve the dispute, institute enforcement proceedings in 
federal court. 5 If the EEOC chooses not to litigate, the complainant 
may sue the defendant in federal court.6 In states that have enacted 
• Member, Illinois Bar. B.A. 1974, Bethel College; J.D. 1977, Northwestern University. 
-Ed. 
•• Member, Illinois Bar. B.S. 1974, Illinois State University; J.D. 1977, Northwestern 
University. - Ed. 
*** Member, Illinois Bar. B.S. 1977, Marquette University; M.B.A. 1981, J.D. 1981, Uni-
versity of Notre Dame. - Ed. 
t One of the authors is associated with the law firm that represented the defendants in 
Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp., Nos. 80-2792 & 80-2844, slip op. (7th Cir. Aug. 14, 1981), a 
Seventh Circuit case whose treatment of the preclusion issue is discussed in this Article, but the 
authors played no role in the preparation of that case. The views expressed in this Article are 
those of the authors alone. 
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
2. See, e.g., Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980); Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522 
(1972); Davis v. Valley Distrib. Co., 522 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1090 
(1977). 
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(1) (1976). See generally Equal Employment Opportunity: Hear-
ings on R.R. 405 and Similar Bills Before the Gen. Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on 
Education and Labor, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26, 
reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391, 2401; H.R. REP. No. 570, 88th Cong., 
1st Sess. 1-3 (1963); S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1964). 
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976). 
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l), (3) (1976). 
6. Where the EEOC determines that there is no reasonable cause to believe that a charge is 
true, it must dismiss the charge and issue the complainant a statutory right-to-sue letter. 
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a "law prohibiting the unlawful practice alleged," section 706(c) of 
the Act,7 the so-called "deferral" provision, guarantees state authori-
ties first opportunity to resolve the charge. Most states afford both 
investigatory review similar to that provided by the EEOC and full-
scale evidentiary hearings before an administrative tribunal.8 Com-
plainants can then obtain review of the agency's findings in state 
courts.9 
Although the Act's "deferral" provision establishes an important 
role for state enforcement proceedings, state jurisdiction is not exclu-
sive. Sixty days after filing with a state, complainants may enter the 
federal system.10 It is thus possible that each employment discrimi-
nation charge will be heard in four separate forums: a state adminis-
trative agency, a state court, the EEOC, and, finally, a federal court. 
The obvious and critical question raised by these overlapping juris-
Where the Commission has not filed a civil action against the employer, the EEOC must, if 
requested, issue a right-to-sue letter I 80 days after the charge was filed. Within 90 days after 
receipt of the right-to-sue letter, the complainant may institute a civil action in federal district 
. court against the party named in the charge. See 42 U.S.C § 2000-5(1)(1), (3) (1976). 
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976) provides: 
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State, or f olit-
ical subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawfu em-
ployment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to 
grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect 
thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no charge may be filed under subsection (b) of this 
section by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have 
been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier 
terminated, provided that such sixty-day period shall be extended to one hundred and 
twenty days during the first year after the effective date of such State or local law. If any 
requirement for the commencement of such proceedings is imposed by a State or local 
authority other than a requirement of the filing of a written and signed statement of the 
facts upon which the proceeding is based, the proceeding shall be deemed to have been 
commenced for the purposes of this subsection at the time such statement is sent by regis-
tered mail to the appropriate State or local authority. 
When an employment discrimination charge is filed directly with the EEOC, 
the Commission shall, before taking any action with respect to such charge, notify the 
appropriate State or local officials and, upon request, afford them a reasonable time, but 
not less than sixty days (provided that such sixty-day period shall be extended to one 
hundred and twenty days during the first year after the effective day of such State or local 
law), unless a shorter period is requested, to act under such State or local law to remedy 
the practice alleged. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1976). A complete listing of title VII deferral agencies is contained at 
29 C.F.R. § 1601.74 (1980). 
8. E.g., CAL. GOVT. CODE§§ 12963, 12967-69 (Deering Supp. 1981); FLA, STAT. ANN, 
§ 23, 166 (West 1981); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, ~~ 7-102{c), 8-106 (1980); MICH, STAT, ANN. 
§ 3.548(602) (1977); N.Y. EXEC. LAW§§ 294,297 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1980); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN, § 4112.05 (Page 1980). 
9. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, ~ 8-111 (1980); MICH. STAT. ANN.§ 3.548(606); N.Y. EXEC, 
LAW§ 297(4)(g) (McKinney Supp. 1972-1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.06(E) {Page 
1980); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.260 (1979). 
10. See New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 64 (1980); Love v. Pullman 
Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972). 
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dictional provisions concerns the weight, if any, that one forum must 
attach to a prior determination rendered in another. 
In most contexts, the answer has already been given. Within the 
state systems, most courts are required by statute to accept :findings 
of state agencies that are supported by substantial evidence.11 
Within the federal system, the Supreme Court has declared that the 
EEOC's investigatory :findings are admissible, but not conclusive, ev-
idence in federal courts. 12 And the 1972 amendment to section 
706(c) requires the EEOC to assign "substantial weight to final :find-
ings and orders made by state or local authorities."13 Yet one issue 
- the deference that federal courts must give to state findings - has 
generated an important controversy that the Supreme Court has re-
cently agreed to resolve.14 
Following the Sixth Circuit's opinion in, Cooper v. Philp Morris, 
Inc. ,15 the Third, 16 Fifth, 17 Seventh,18 and Eighth Circuit19 Courts of 
Appeals have held that a federal court may attribute partial, but not 
preclusive, deference to the prior decisions of state tribunals. 20 
Cooper and its progeny have misconstrued both the congressional 
intent underlying title VII and the Supreme Court's decision inA!ex-
11. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, ~ 8-111 (1980); N.Y. EXEC. LAW§ 297 (McKinney 1972) 
and § 298 (McKinney Supp. 1977-80); N.Y. C1v. PRAC. LAW § 7803(3)(4) (McKinney 1963); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.06(E) (Page 1980); WASH. REV. CODE§ 49.60.260 (1979). See 
Rosen, The Law and Racial Discrimination in Employment, 53 CAL. L. REV. 729, 779 (1965). 
But see MICH. STAT. ANN.§ 3.548(606) (Supp. 1981) (court review de novo). 
12. See Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 844-46, 863 n.39 (1976); McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973); Jones v. WFYR Radio/RKO Gen., 626 F.2d 576, 
577 (7th Cir. 1980) ("[I]f the court finds that the EEOC's determination is supported by sub-
stantial evidence and that the plaintiff's objections to the determination are insubstantial, it 
may accord the Commission's findings weight."). 
13. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261 § 4a, 86 Stat. 104 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976)). 
14. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 623 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. 
Ct. 3107 (1981) (No. 80-6045). 
15. 464 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1972). See Lyght v. Ford Motor Co., 643 F.2d 435 (6th Cir. 1981). 
16. Smouse v. General Elec. Co., 626 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam). 
17. See Gamer v. Giarrusso, 571 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1978). 
18. Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp., Nos. 80-2792 & 80-2844, slip op. (7th Cir. Aug. 
14, 1981) (citing Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 503 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 
U.S. 928 (1975)). 
19. Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 
U.S. 966 (1980). 
20. Rather than using the term "substantial," some courts have held that state decisions 
deserve "appropriate" weight. Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp., Nos. 80-2792 & 80-2844, 
slip op. at 8; Smouse v. General Elec. Co., 626 F.2d at 335. See Gunther v. Iowa State Men's 
Reformatory, 612 F.2d at 1084 ("prior state proceedings are entitled to weight"). One court 
held that state decisions do not bind a federal court but did not discuss what weight, if any, 
state decisions should receive. Gamer v. Giarrusso, 571 F.2d at 1336-37. 
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ander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 21 They have established a blanket rule 
that permits a "second, independent federal action even though [the 
identical claims have been litigated in a state forum]."22 
In Sinicropi v. Nassau County,23 the Second Circuit reached a 
quite different conclusion, holding that res judicata applies automat-
ically in cases where, at the complainant's behest, a state court has 
reviewed a state administrative decision.24 This unqualified preclu-
sion rule is equally unsatisfying. Although the Supreme Court's re-
cent decision in Allen v. McCurry25 holds that federal courts are 
presumptively bound by prior state decisions, courts must determine 
whether Congress intended that a particular statute override this pre-
sumption.26 The Second Circuit did not explore this possibility. 
Rather, it ignored title VII's legislative history, and rested its deci-
sion on an unexplained, single-sentence analogy between title VII 
and section 1981: "[W]e see no reason to distinguish between section 
1981 and title VII for res judicata purposes."27 Perhaps due to its 
faulty methodology, the Second Circuit's use of preclusion principles 
is paradoxically too broad and too restrictive. Its rule is too broad 
because it gives preclusive effect to informal state investigatory find-
ings. This standard is simultaneously too restrictive because it re-
fuses to give preclusive effect to a state administrative adjudication 
unless the complainant initiates judicial review in state court. 
This Article suggests that the correct answer lies between the po-
sitions adopted by the courts of appeals. The full faith and credit 
clause,28 made applicable to the federal courts by Congress in section 
1738 of title 28 of the United States Code,29 title VII's legislative 
history,30 and the policies of efficiency and consistency upon which 
preclusion doctrines are based31 all play important roles in defining 
21. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
22. Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1083 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
446 U.S. 966 (1980). 
23. 601 F.2d 60 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 983 (1979). The Sinicropl 
court relied on Mitchell v. NBC, 553 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that a state administra-
tive agency's dismissal of a race discrimination claim brought under New York's fair employ-
ment law barred a subsequent claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in federal court). 
24. 601 F.2d at 61-62. For a full discussion and criticism of the Second Circuit's title VII 
preclusion doctrine see notes 202-14 infra and accompanying text. 
25. 101 S. Ct. 411 (1980). 
26. See Part I infra. 
27. 601 F.2d at 62. 
28. U.S. Const. art. IV, § I. 
29. 28 u.s.c. § 1738 (1976). 
30. See Part II.A infra. 
31. See Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 101 S. Ct. 2424, 2427-28 (1981); Allen v. 
McCurry, 101 S. Ct. 411, 415 (1980) ("Res judicata and collateral estoppel not only reduce 
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the correct solution. Provided that the state's fair employment prac-
tices laws parallel title VII, the doctrines of res judicata and collat-
eral estoppel should preclude relitigation of claims and issues that 
were or could have been fully and fairly litigated in a state 
proceeding. 
The Article proceeds from the premise, established in Part I, that 
federal courts must apply preclusion principles unless Congress 
clearly indicates otherwise. Part II considers a number of indicators 
of Congress's intent, and finds no evidence to rebut the presumption 
that federal courts must give preclusive weight to certain state deci-
sions. Part III then proposes general guidelines for the application 
of preclusion doctrines in title VII litigation. 
I. THE PRESUMPTIVE APPLICABILITY OF R.Es JUDICATA 
AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
The deference that federal courts owe prior state determinations 
derives from the full faith and credit clause.32 To promote comity 
and efficiency, the clause's implementing legislation, section 1738, 
expressly applies its command to both federal and state courts: 
"Such . . . judicial proceedings . . . shall have the same full faith 
and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories 
and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such 
State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken."33 Section 
1738 thus requires "federal courts to give preclusive effect to state-
court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the 
judgments emerged would do so."34 
Despite section 1738's straightforward language, courts have not 
unnecessary litigation and foster reliance on adjudication, but also promote the comity be-
tween state and federal courts that has been recognized as a bulwark of the federal system."); 
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 192-
93 (1947). See generally 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE§ 4403 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 48, Comment a, at 36 
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § l,_ Comment a (1942). 
32. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to public Acts, Records, and Judi-
cial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe 
the manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect 
thereof. 
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. 
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976). The statute was originally enacted just after the ratification of 
the Constitution. See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122, and was reenacted a few years 
later, Act of Mar. 27, 1804, ch. 56, 2 Stat. 298-99. As adopted in 1790, the act required that a 
state judgment be accorded "such faith and credit" as it would have "by law or usage in the 
courts of the state" in which it was rendered. See Allen v. McCurry, 101 S. Ct. 411, 416 n.8 
(1980); 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 31, at§ 4467. 
34. Allen v. Mccurry, 101 S. Ct. at 415. Accord, Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947); 
Roller v. Murray, 234 U.S. 738 (1914). 
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always heeded its mandate.35 In title VII cases, for instance, some 
federal courts have neglected to mention section 1738, and instead 
have invoked general principles to resolve the preclusion issue.36 
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Allen v. McCurry,31 how-
ever, should dispel any lingering doubts concerning the applicability 
of section 1738. 
Relying heavily on section 1738, theAllen Court held that preclu-
sion rules apply in section 1983 litigation,38 and may bar federal 
courts from freshly deciding constitutional claims previously liti-
gated in state courts. The petitioner inAllen had been convicted in a 
Missouri state court of illegal possession of heroin and assault with 
intent to kill. At a pretrial hearing, the trial court rejected the peti-
tioner's contention that the police had seized evidence in violation of 
the fourth amendment. After his conviction, the petitioner filed a 
section 1983 action in federal court, alleging, inter alia, that the 
search and seizure had violated his constitutional rights. Reversing 
the Eighth Circuit,39 the Court held that section 1983 did not auto-
matically entitle the petitioner to a de novo hearing of his constitu-
tional claim in federal court.40 The Allen Court considered the issue 
against the "background"41 of section 1738's specific requirements, 
and concluded that federal courts cannot re-decide claims raised in 
35. Federal courts have often decided what weight to give prior state decisions without 
referring to§ 1738. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979); Turco v. Monroe 
County Bar Assn., 554 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); Newman v. Board 
of Educ., 508 F.2d 277 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975); Blankner v. City of Chi-
cago, 504 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975); Parker v. McKeithen, 488 
F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974). See generally Winters v. Lavine, 574 
F.2d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing cases); .Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federal-
ism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1334 nn.14 & 15 (1977) [hereinafter cited as .Developments]. 
36. See, e.g., Cooper v. Philip Morris, Inc., 464 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1972). 
37. 101 S. Ct. 488 (1980). 
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, 
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
39. Mccurry v. Allen, 606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979), revd, 101 S. Ct. 411 (1980). 
40. The Eighth Circuit, noting that the Supreme Court's decision in Stone v. Powell, 428 
U.S. 465 (1976), barred the plaintiff from federal habeas corpus relief and that federal courts 
have a special role in protecting civil rights, held that a de novo § 1983 federal trial was neces-
sary to ensure the plaintiff a federal forum for his constitutional claims. 606 F.2d at 799. The 
Allen court rejected the two premises of the Eighth Circuit's argument. The Court first stated 
that Stone v. Powell did not provide "a logical doctrinal source" for the Eighth Circuit's ruling 
because the availability of habeas corpus relief "has no bearing on § 1983 suits or on the 
question of the preclusive effect of state court judgments." 101 S. Ct. at 419. The Court next 
rejected the "generally framed principle" that a plaintiff must have a federal forum in which to 
litigate civil rights claims. 101 S. Ct. at 419. 
41. 101 S. Ct. at 416. 
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section 1983 actions that have been fully and fairly litigated in a state 
court. 
Although Al/en emphasized the vitality of section 1738, that sec-
tion alone is not conclusive. Allen reminds the federal courts that 
they must not overlook section 1738's clear command; it does not 
counsel blind adherence to that statute. Because Congress has the 
power to override section 1738 and common-law preclusion rules, 
courts must diligently analyze legislative purposes and history to de-
termine whether Congress has done so in particular instances. Here 
the message of the Allen Court is unmistakable: Only the clearest 
expression of a contrary legislative intent displaces the requirements 
of section 1738. 
The Allen Court was confronted with some legislative history 
from which it might reasonably have inferred a congressional desire 
to allow plaintiffs a de novo federal hearing. "One strong motive" 
behind the enactment of section 1983, the Court noted, was "the 
grave congressional concern that the state courts had been deficient 
in protecting federal rights."42 A pervasive distrust of the state 
courts' capacity to render substantively fair decisions would seem to 
imply that final authority to promulgate substantive law should rest 
with federal courts,43 but the Allen Court declared: "[M]uch clearer 
support than this would be required to hold that § 1738 and the 
traditional rules of preclusion are not applicable to § 1983 suits."44 
In fact, the Court's opinion indicates that evidence of an intent to 
override section 1738 must rise to the level of an implied repeal,45 a 
doctrine generally applied only upon "some affirmative showing"46 
42. 101 S. Ct. at 417. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (Congress enacting 
§ 1983 was concerned "that state instrumentalities could not protect those [federally created] 
rights"). 
43. See Freiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 509 n.14 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Aver-
itt, Federal Section 1983 Actions After State Court Judgment, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 191, 208-11 
(1972); Theis, Res Judicata in Civil Rights Act Cases: An Introduction to the Problem, 70 Nw. 
U. L. REV. 859, 868 (1976); Developments, supra note 35, at 1335-43 . .But see Currie, Res 
Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 328-29 (1978) (footnotes omitted): 
All grants of federal jurisdiction are based upon some perceived inadequacy of state 
courts. Diversity jurisdiction rests upon fear of state court prejudice against "foreigners," 
federal question jurisdiction upon fear of state court hostility to or misunderstanding of 
federal rights. Yet Congress did not carry these policies so far as to oust state courts of 
concurrent jurisdiction over federal question or diversity cases, nor of cases within section 
1983. 
44. 101 S. Ct. at 417. 
45. 101 S. Ct. at 417. 
46. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974). The Morton Court also stated that courts 
may employ the implied repeal technique where the earlier and later statutes are irreconcila-
ble. 417 U.S. at 550. The language of § 1738 and title VII, however, is not facially 
inconsistent. 
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of a "clear and manif est"47 legislative purpose. 
Allen v. Mccurry thus neatly frames the question at hand: Un-
less an affirmative congressional desire to displace preclusion princi-
ples can be clearly discerned, section 1738 requires that federal 
courts apply those principles to decisions rendered by state tribunals 
under title VII's deferral provision. Part II of this Article searches 
for such a congressional desire. 
II. LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
Because the language of title VII and its subsequent amendments 
does not expressly address the preclusion issue, Congress's intent 
must be gleaned from less explicit sources.48 Courts have accord-
ingly sought guidance from a 1972 amendment to the Act,49 the 
Supreme Court's decision inAlexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. ,so and 
the general structure of title VII's enforcement scheme.s 1 The most 
obvious starting point, however, is the legislative history underlying 
the 1964 Act itself, a source that the courts regrettably have slighted. 
A. The History of the 1964 Act 
The unusual circumstances surrounding title VII's enactment 
make analysis especially difficult.s2 Unfortunately, courts interpret-
ing title VII do not have the benefit of legislative reports, which are 
traditionally considered among the most illuminating and reliable 
indicators of Congress's intent. A report accompanied the House 
version of title VII,s3 but a substitute measure introduced in the Sen-
ates4 substantially modified that bill. The Senate bill, a compromise 
measure hammered out in informal bipartisan conferences domi-
nated by Senators Mansfield, Dirksen, Humphrey, and Kuchel, was 
47. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 158 (1976) (quoting United States v, 
Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939) (quoting Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U.S. 596, 602 (1882)). 
48. As Chief Justice Marshall stated: "Where the mind labours to discover the design of 
the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be derived." United States v. Fisher, 6 
U.S. (2 Cranch) 202, 205 (1805), cited in Consumer Prod. Safety Commn. v. GTE Sylvania, 
447 U.S. 102, 118 n.13 (1980). 
49. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4a, 86 Stat. 104 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976)). 
50. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
51. See Batiste v. Fumco Constr. Corp., 503 F.2d 447, 450 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 
U.S. 928 (1975). 
52. For a discussion of the events mentioned in the text, see UNITED STATES EQUAL EM-
PLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 at 7-11, 3001 (1968). 
53. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1964) U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. 
NEWS 2391. 
54. Amend. No. 656 to H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CONG. REC. 11,926 (1964). 
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passed without an explanatory report.55 And, because the House ac-
cepted the Senate's revisions without exception, there was no Senate-
House Conference Report.56 Even without the usual interpretative 
guideposts, however, several important conclusions can be drawn 
from the House bill, the Senate's revisions, and the legislators' ex-
planatory statements. 
By 1964, over half of the states had enacted some form of equal 
employment legislaton.57 Troubling questions concerning the extent 
to which title VII should defer to state standards and procedures in-
evitably arose. Yet despite the plethora of proposed amendments58 
and sometimes impassioned debates, most legislators shared a com-
mon ground. They agreed that states should play an important role 
in enforcing title VII, but they also felt that the federal system should 
only defer to "adequate" state decisions. 59 Disagreements did exist, 
however, about the best way to accomplish these two goals. As Sen-
ator Dirksen, one of the principal architects of title VII's deferral 
provision, recognized, Congress faced the "knotty"60 problem of 
drafting a bill that would "assure individual complainants that they 
will have fair and expeditious consideration of their grievances and 
still retain sufficient authority in the Federal Commission to carry 
forward the purposes and objectives of [title VIl]."61 
Congress considered a number of possible ways to achieve these 
goals. One approach would have been to presume the adequacy of 
state laws, limiting title VII's jurisdiction to states without fair em-
ployment laws. Most legislators, however, recognized that this pre-
sumption was unrealistic because "[i]n many areas effective 
enforcement is hampered by inadequate legislation, inadequate pro-
cedures, or an inadequate budget."62 A second alternative would 
have been to allow Congress to assess the adequacy of state laws, 
but, as Senators Clark and Chase observed: "Such a proposal is un-
workable. Congress cannot determine nor can we devise a formula 
55. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CONG. REC. 14,511 (1964). See UNITED STATES 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, supra note 52, at 3001. 
56. H.R. Res. 789, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CoNG. REc. 15,897. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). See 
UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, supra note 52, at 3001. 
57. Senator Clark (D., Pa.) pointed out that 28 states and some 48 cities had fair employ-
ment practices laws or ordinances. 110 CONG. REC. 7205 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark). 
58. See UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, supra note 52, 
apps. 1-11 (listing amendments adopted and rejected). 
59. See notes 62-81 iefra and accompanying text. 
60. 110 CONG. REc. 13,087 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen). 
61. 110 CoNG. REc. 8193 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen). 
62. 110 CONG. REc. 7205 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Case). 
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for determining which State laws and procedures are adequate."63 
Representative McClory advanced a third solution: title VII would 
apply only where the President had determined that state laws were 
inadequate or that the state was not adequately enforcing those 
laws.64 The House rejected McClory's proposal.65 Although it did 
not state its reasons, two factors probably contributed to the deci-
sion. First, because of the remoteness of the President from the daily 
administration of state civil rights laws, McClory's amendment made 
it difficult to review the adequacy of state laws. 66 Second, the 
amendment placed the authority to evaluate state laws in the hands 
of the President, a person less familiar with the vagaries of state law 
than the EEOC or the courts. 
As title VII emerged from the House, it empowered the EEOC to 
assess the adequacy of state laws and procedures. 67 In "cases or 
classes of cases" for which the EEOC deemed state laws and proce-
dures adequate, it could enter work-sharing agreements giving the 
state exclusive jurisdiction. Under such a work-sharing agreement, 
63. 110 CONG. REC. 7214 (1964) (interpretive memorandum on the house bill, H.R. 7152). 
Senators Clark and Chase were floor managers for the House-passed bill. UNITED STATES 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, supra note 52, at 3039. 
64. Representative McClory's amendment provided: 
Where there is a State or local agency which has power to eliminate and prohibit discrimi-
nation in employment in cases covered by this title, the Commission shall not exercise 
jurisdiction under this title unless and until the President of the United States determines 
that such state or local agency no longer has such power or is no longer adequately exer-
cising such power. 
110 CoNG. REC. 2728 (1964). 
65. 110 CONG. REC. 2728 (1964). 
66. The difficulty of challenging the adequacy of state laws may also have played a central 
role in the House's rejection of an amendment offered by Representative Cramer. Cramer's 
amendment would have given states with fair employment laws exclusive jurisdiction unless 
the EEOC, after formal hearing, expressly determined "that existing State law will not reason-
ably accomplish the objective of [title VII]." I 10 CONG. REc. 2727 (1964). The EEOC's deter-
mination was to be subject to judicial review. The House, without comment, defeated 
Cramer's amendment. 110 CONG. REC. 2727 (1964). The bill first adopted by the House made 
it much easier to oust exclusive state jurisdiction. The bill empowered the EEOC to decide 
whether to give the states exclusive jurisdiction over a complaint or class of complaints but the 
EEOC was not required to make an express finding of the inadequacy of state law subject to 
judicial review. See notes 67-70 iefra and accompanying text. 
67. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. § 708(b) (1964). The bill states: 
Where there is a State or local agency which has effective power to eliminate and prohibit 
discrimination in employment in cases covered by this title, and the Commission deter-
mines the agency is effectively exercising such power, the Commission shall seek written 
agreements with the State or local agency under which the Commission shall refrain from 
bringing a civil action in any cases or class of cases referred to in such agreement. No 
person may bring a civil action under section 707(c) in any cases or class or cases referred 
to in such agreement. The Commission shall rescind any such agreement when it deter-
mines such agency no longer has such power or is no longer effectively exercising such 
power. 
See 110 CONG. REC. 7214 (1964) (interpretative memorandum of Senators Clark and Case on 
H.R. 7152) (stating that EEOC must determine whether to exercise its jurisdiction based on its 
evaluation of the "effectiveness" of state "standards and procedures"). 
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the EEOC would decline to hear the charge, and the complainant 
could not file a private action in federal court.68 Representative Mc-
Clory's proposed amendment and the House-approved bill thus 
shared a common foundation69 - complete federal deference to 
"adequate" state laws70 - but the bills contained different methods 
for determining the adequacy of state laws. 
The Senate bill that was finally signed into law created yet an-
other method for evaluating the adequacy of state laws and proce-
dures. Like the House version, the Senate bill authorized the EEOC 
to enter into work-sharing agreements with state agencies.71 In con-
trast to the House bill, however, the Senate bill guaranteed all states 
with fair employment practices laws an initial opportunity to resolve 
charges.72 But this state jurisdiction does not necessarily foreclose 
access to the federal system. Nothing in the Act prevents a com-
plainant from suing in federal court after a state has adjudicated his 
claim.73 
68. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. § 708(b) (1964) ("No person may bring a civil action 
under section 707(c) in any case or class of cases" referred to the state under an EEOC work-
sharing agreement). 
69. Representative Cramer's proposed amendment, discussed in note 66 supra, was also 
based on the premise that federal officials should defer completely to adequate and effective 
state laws. 
70. Senator Carlson, for instance, stated his expectation that the House bill would have 
"but little effect within Kansas,'' his home state. 110 CONG. REC. 10,520 (1964). Because the 
bill directed the EEOC to seek written agreements giving states with adequate and effectively 
enforced nondiscrimination laws exclusive jurisdiction, Senator Carlson stated, "[I]t is to be 
expected that discrimination in employment would be handled by State officials under State 
law .... " Id 
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(b) (1976) states in pertinent part: 
In furtherance of such cooperative efforts, the Commission may enter into written agree-
ments with such State or local agencies and such agreements may include provisions 
under which the Commission shall refrain from processing a charge in any cases or class 
of cases specified in such agreements or under which the Commission shall relieve any 
person or class of persons in such State or locality from requirements imposed under this 
section. The Commission shall rescind any such agreement whenever it determines that 
the agreement no longer serves the interest of effective enforcement of this subchapter. 
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976). 
73. Even though the EEOC declines to process a charge under a work-sharing agreement, 
the statute does not prevent the complainant from filing with the EEOC after expiration of the 
60-day deferral period. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976). Assuming that the EEOC, bound 
by the work-sharing agreement, takes no action on the charge, the complainant can sue in 
federal court 180 days after filing with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1976): 
[I]f within one hundred and eighty days from filing of such charge . . . the Commission 
has not filed a civil action under this section . . . or the Commission has not entered into 
a conciliation agreement to which the aggrieved is a party, the Commission . . . shall so 
notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil 
action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge (A) by the person 
claiming to be aggrieved . . . . 
This language contrasts with the House bill's express prohibition against private civil ac-
tions where a work-sharing agreement allows the state to process the charge. See note 68 
supra. Even though title VII, unlike the House bill, does not state that a work-sharing agree-
ment necessarily precludes a private civil action in federal court, a work-sharing agreement 
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The provision that allows access to federal courts is crucial. 
Whether a federal court may give preclusive weight to state decisions 
depends on the purpose of this provision. The position espoused by 
Cooper and its progeny would maintain that the provision evinces 
Congress's intent to afford complainants a relatively unfettered op-
portunity to reargue their cases. However, nothing in the legislative 
history of the 1964 Act suggests that Congress considered an unqual-
ified right to relitigate in federal court necessary or desirable. In 
fact, Senator Dirksen, the principal drafter of the Senate bill,74 ob-
jected to full litigation of a single claim in both state and federal 
forums: 
What a layering upon layer of enforcement. What if the court orders 
differed in their terms or requirements? There would be no assurance 
that they would be identical. Should we have the Federal forces of 
justice pull on the one arm, and the State forces of justice tug on the 
other? Should we draw and quarter the victim?75 
Senator Dirksen recognized that under the House bill a work-shar-
ing agreement would prevent relitigation but asked: "[l]f that agree-
ment did not come to pass, where would we be under the provisions 
of overlapping Federal and State statutes?"76 These remarks were 
made before the drafting of the Senate bill but one may reasonably 
suppose that the Dirksen-Mansfield-Humphrey-Kuchel substitute 
bill reflects Senator Dirksen's desire to avoid "multiple suits against 
the same defendant arising out of the same discrimination."77 The 
available evidence thus suggests that the Senate accepted the premise 
of the McClory and House-approved bills that the federal system 
should defer completely to "adequate" state decisions. 
The Senate apparently objected to the anticipatory nature of the 
method adopted by the House. The House bill required the EEOC 
to assess the adequacy of state law before the state had actually 
heard the charge. The Senate bill gave federal courts the delicate 
may include such a restriction. See 110 CONG. REC. 12,820 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen) 
("Such agreements may also provide that civil actions may not be brought under this title in 
the Federal courts .... "). The typical work-sharing agreement, however, contains no such 
restriction. See Work Sharing Agreement Between the Equal Employment Opportunity Com• 
mission and the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission (as amended July 29, 1980) 
(on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
74. See 110 CONG. REC. 12,593 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark): 
I think either the credit or the blame [for the changes in title VII] •.• should go 
primarily to the Senator from Illinois [Mr. Dirksen], for it was he who took the initiative, 
summoned the meetings, and presided over the arduous sessions at which a number of 
suggested changes - initiated by him and by members of his staff - eventually were 
hammered out on the anvil oflong discussions, and were incorporated into the substitute. 
75. 110 CONG. REc. 6449 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen). 
76. 110 CONG. REc. 6450 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen). 
77. Id 
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task of determining the adequacy of state laws, remedies, and proce-
dures on a case-by-case basis after the state proceedings have ended. 
The Senate evidently reasoned, and the House subsequently agreed, 
that the adequacy issue is often not ripe for decision before the state 
has actually acted on a charge. Because facts will vary, laws are 
complex, and a case's procedural context is difficult to predict, evalu-
ation in advance of decision is a rather risky endeavor. Postdecision 
review in federal court is necessary to correct deficiencies in state 
procedures, remedies, and rights that become apparent only after a 
decision has been rendered. At the same time, consistent with the 
Senate's intention to increase the states' role in enforcement efforts, 78 
the availability of postdecision review allows state jurisdiction to be 
expanded. The Senate bill eliminated the need to oust state jurisdic-
tion on the basis of the EEOC's anticipatory judgment that state law 
is inadequate because federal courts can assess the adequacy of state 
laws and procedures after the decision. Senator Dirksen, for in-
stance, disapproved of the House bill's provision that "a Federal 
commission or administrator would say whether the State law is ef-
fective and effectively administered."79 Foreshadowing the Senate 
bill, Senator Dirksen declared: "I desire a court to say whether the 
people in my State are effectively administering our FEPC Act or 
not."80 The bill thus authorized postdecision judicial review not to 
lower the threshold of deference due state decisions, but to ensure 
the adequacy of those decisions.81 
The principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel are consis-
tent with the federal courts' assigned task. First, preclusion doctrines 
allow federal courts to ensure that state proceedings are fair and that 
complainants have an opportunity to argue their cases in a formal, 
adversarial setting. In accord with the Allen Court's formulation, 
18. See notes 82-94 infra and accompanying text. 
79. 110 CONG. R.Ec. 6451 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen). 
80. Id 
81. The comments of Senator Clark, the Senate co-floor manager of the House-approved 
bill, concerning the Mansfield-Dirksen-Humphrey-Kuchel sub,stitute are illustrative. Senator 
Clark recognized that the substitute both gave "greater deference to the States" and permitted 
the adequacy of state decisions to be subsequently tested in the federal system. Citing the 
inefficacy of some state laws, Senator Clark criticized the substitute's blanket provision for 
initial State jurisdiction. Although he realized that the federal system could "eventually" cor-
rect any deficiencies, he objected to delaying federal access: "In many a case I fear that the 
end result will be that justice delayed is justice denied." l IO CONG. R.Ec. 12,595 (1964) (re-
marks of Sen. Clark). 
Despite his criticisms, Senator Clark voted for the substitute: "After a good deal of careful 
thought, I have concluded that the weakening changes are not so great as to make it impossible 
to achieve the objectives of the title, although they certainly make it more difficult." I IO 
CONG. REC. 12,595 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark); 110 CONG. R.Ec. 14,239, 14,511 (1964) 
(votes of the Senate). 
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federal courts can withhold preclusive effect from state decisions not 
"fully and fairly litigated." Second, preclusion doctrines permit fed-
eral courts to ensure the sufficiency of the substantive and remedial 
standards employed by state tribunals. A state decision can have res 
judicata effect only if the state provides the same "cause of action" 
- a requirement that this Article reads to mean that state law must 
entirely conform to title VII's substantive standards. And where 
state remedies are inferior, collateral estoppel will not prevent com-
plainants from seeking additional relief under title VII. Preclusion 
principles thus fully accommodate Congress's predominant concern 
for the adequacy of state laws and procedures. 
A defender of the Cooper court's approach might concede that 
preclusion doctrines are consistent with the goals that Congress 
sought to accomplish, but argue that a partial deference standard is 
equally consistent with those goals. A partial deference standard 
guarantees the procedural fairness of state decisions because com-
plainants have the benefit of the formal, adversarial procedures 
available in federal courts. Furthermore, decisions will always be 
consistent with title VII's substantive and remedial standards. In-
deed, state decisions are given some weight, but federal law is ulti-
mately applied. This argument, however, cannot succeed. Although 
the Cooper partial deference standard satisfies Congress's desire for 
adequate state decisions, it frustrates Congress's equally important 
concern that state procedures be utilized to "the maximum extent 
possible. "82 
As we have seen, the drafters of the Senate bill evidently ac-
cepted the premise implicit in the McClory and House bills that the 
federal system should completely defer to adequate state decisions. 83 
The great weight attributed to state proceedings in the Senate de-
bates bolsters this conclusion. Senator Humphrey, one of the draft-
ers of title VII's deferral provision, stressed the importance of state 
agencies hi the total enforcement scheme: "The most important 
82. 110 CONG. R.Ec. 1521 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler) (''To the maximum extent possi-
ble, title VII provides for the utilization of existing State fair employment laws and proce-
dures."); 110 CONG. REC. 7243 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Case) ("Ample provision has been 
made in title VII for the utilization of existing State fair employment laws and procedures to 
the maximum extent possible."). These two congressmen were speaking of the bill first ap-
proved by the House. The Senate substitute, as we have seen, altered the initial House-ap-
proved bill's provisions regarding federal/state enforcement efforts. Nevertheless, 
immediately preceding the House's approval of the Senate substitute, Representative Celler 
stated that these changes were "consistent with the intent of the House bill." 110 CoNo, REC, 
15,896 (1964). Indeed, the Senate intended that its bill increase the deference owing to state 
enforcement efforts. See notes 85-86 in.fro. 
83. See notes 71-81 supra and accompanying text. 
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changes give greater recognition to the role of State and local action 
against discrimination."84 Rather than limiting the deference that 
the House bill would have given to state decisions, the Senate 
designed its bill to upgrade the states' role. 85 Consistent with Sena-
tor Humphrey's sentiments, Senator Clark spoke of the states as 
equal partners in title VII enforcement efforts: "[Title VII] is so 
drafted that States and the Federal Government can work to-
gether. . . . [T]itle VII meshes nicely, logically, and coherently with 
the State and city legislation already in existence . . . ."86 
The Supreme Court's recent decision in New York Gaslight Club, 
Inc. v. Carey87 further highlights the importance of state proceed-
ings. The issue in Gaslight Club was whether title VII authorized 
federal courts to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party for work 
performed in state deferral proceedings. The Court relied on the in-
tended cooperative relationship between state and federal enforce-
ment efforts to hold that the federal court must award attorneys' fees. 
After rejecting the argument that the "action or proceeding"88 lan-
guage of section 706(k) referred only to federal proceedings, 89 the 
Court emphasized the need to preserve the significance of state par-
ticipation in title VII's enforcement structure. The Court feared that 
complainants unable to recover fees incurred in state proceedings 
would flee to the federal system, and declared: "Only authorization 
84. llO CONG. REC. 12,707 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). 
85. See llO CONG. REC. ll,936 (1964) {remarks of Sen. Humphrey); llO CONG. REC. 
11,935, 11,936 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen); 110 CONG. REC. 12,595 (1964) (remarks of 
Sen. Clark); llO CONG. REC. 13,081 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark) ("Clearly, under the 
mechanics of the bill in the form with which the leadership is concerned, more concern or 
more deference could not be given to the rights of the States."); 110 CONG. REC. 13,089, 14,258 
(1964) (remarks of Sen. Saltonstall); llO CONG. REC. 14,313 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Miller) 
("Action by the Federal Government should, to the maximum extent practicable, be taken in 
consonance with the preservation of States rights."); 110 CONG. REC. 14,331 (1964) (remarks of 
Sen. Williams) ("One of the principal changes made by the Senate was to preserve State 
sovereignty."). 
86. 110 CONG. REC. 7205 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark). Senator Clark was speaking of 
the House bill. See 110 CONG. REC. 1521 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler) ("Through coopera-
tive efforts with State and local agencies, title VII envisions an effective and harmonious mo-
bilization of Federal, State, and local authorities in attacking this national problem."). The 
Senate intended its bill to further enhance the cooperative and equal partnership between 
federal and state enforcement authorities. See llO CONG. REc.14,335 (1964) (remarks of Sen. 
Williams) (''We believe that the Federal-State partnership evolving from this bill will enhance 
our progress even more."); note 85 supra. See also Tooles v. Kellogg Co., 336 F. Supp. 14, 17 
(D. Neb. 1972) (early title VII decision holding that preclusion principles apply to title VII 
cases because the act requires deference to state decisions). 
87. 447 U.S. 54 (1980). 
88. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976), provides: "In any 
action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing 
party . . . a reasonable attorney's fees as part of the costs . . . ." 
89. 447 U.S. at 62. 
1500 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 79:1485 
of fee awards ensures incorporation of state procedures as a mean-
ingful part of the Title VII enforcement scheme."90 
As the congressional debates and the Supreme Court's decision 
in Gaslight Club make clear, the appropriate standard of deference 
must facilitate respect for and cooperation with state tribunals.91 
The Cooper partial deference standard, however, fails to gjve states 
their due. It permits federal courts to go far beyond merely ensuring 
the adequacy of state laws and procedures. Despite the general con-
sistency of state law with title VII, the fairness of state procedures, 
and the partial deference attributed to state decisions, a federal court 
may overturn those decisions simply because it interprets the rele-
vant facts or applicable law differently. The partial deference stan-
dard requires the federal court to rehear the evidence presented to 
the state tribunal.92 Permitting federal courts to duplicate full evi-
dentiary hearings, overturn :findings of fact, or discard reasonable 
interpretations of adequate laws flies in the face of the congressional 
policies of cooperation and respect.93 Congress clearly did not doubt 
the competence of state tribunals to find facts and construe state 
laws. Rather, as Senator Clark stated, Congress intended that 
"[f]ederal authorities ... stay out of any State or locality which has 
an adequate law and is effectively enforcing it" so that states "will 
have the field to themselves . . . ."94 
In addition to demonstrating that preclusion principles and title 
VII are consistent, this analysis of the legislative history of the 1964 
Act thus points to the stronger conclusion that title VII demands the 
application of those principles. The preclusion doctrine outlined in 
90. 447 U.S. at 65. See 447 U.S. at 66 n.6. 
91. See Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 526 (1972); Dubois v. Packard Bell Corp., 470 
F.2d 973, 975 (10th Cir. 1972) (recognizing the legislative policy behind deferral, through the 
words of Senator Humphrey, as a "guarantee that the states '. . . will be given every opportu-
nity to employ their expertise and experience . . .' "). 
92. See Batiste v. Fumco Constr. Corp., 503 F.2d 447,451 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 
U.S. 928 (1975). The Batiste court stated that the court need not retake the evidence if the 
parties stipulate the prior state record as containing all of the relevant facts. Nonetheless, the 
federal court must draw its own inferences from the stipulated evidence. See Unger v. Consol-
idated Foods Corp., Nos. 80-2792 & 80-2844, slip op. at 8 (7th Cir. Aug. 14, 1981) (arguing that 
Gardner-Denver "recognized Title VII's requirement of a trial de novo ... "), 
93. Commentators have observed that the states' role in title Vll's enforcement scheme 
lacks meaning unless complete deference is given to adequate and effective state decisions: 
The advantages oflocal enforcement cannot be secured unless the deferral is complete 
-ie., unless the EEOC refuses jurisdiction over the claim and treats the state resolution 
of it as dispositive. Any arrangement which provides for less than this will inevitably 
detract from the state agency's effectiveness. Tiie parties will always feel free to ignore the 
state agency so long as they know that there is parallel federal machinery to which they 
can tum if they dislike the state result. 
J)evelopments, supra note 35, at 1215-16. 
94. 110 CONG. R.Ec. 7216 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark). 
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Part III of this Article strikes the intended balance between defer-
ence to state decisional authority, on the one hand, and insistence 
that title VII decisions be rendered according to adequate laws and 
procedures, on the other. Under this Article's formulation, the fed-
eral courts retain final authority to evaluate the consistency between 
state and federal law and the fairness of state procedures. Yet, in 
deference to the vital role that the 1964 Congress envisaged for the 
states, this Article's preclusion doctrine intrudes no further on the 
jurisdiction of the states. 
B. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 
In Alexander v. Gardner-.Denver Co. ,95 the Supreme Court de-
clared: "[F]inal responsibility for enforcement of Title VII is vested 
with federal courts." The legislative materials discussed above 
strongly suggest that granting preclusive effect to adequate state de-
cisions is not inconsistent with the federal courts' role as final arbi-
ters of title VII claims. Nevertheless, most courts of appeals have 
cited Gardner-.Denver and the federal courts' "final responsibility'' in 
support of the rule that title VII complainants are entitled to a de 
novo opportunity to present their cases in federal courts irrespective 
of the nature of the prior state proceedings.96 The Supreme Court, 
however, appears to have rejected that reading of Gardner-.Denver in 
its recent decision in New York Gaslight Club, Inc., v. Carey.97 Cit-
ing Gardner-.Denver, the Court concluded: "Initial resort to state and 
local remedies is mandated, and recourse to the federal forums is 
appropriate only when the State does not provide prompt or com-
plete relief."98 
Gardner-.Denver held that a private arbitral decision based on 
contractual language that tracks the language of title VII will not bar 
a subsequent suit in federal court.99 Despite this narrow holding, 
courts of appeals deciding whether state decisions may bind federal 
courts have quoted language from the Gardner-.Denver opinion that 
appears to sweep rather broadly: 
95. 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). 
96. See, e.g., Smouse v. General Elec. Co., 626 F.2d 333, 334-35 (3rd Cir. 1980); Gunther v. 
Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1082-83 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 
(1980). 
97. 447 U.S. 54 (1980). 
98. 447 U.S. at 65. 
99. 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974). Although the Court, following the district court, analyzed 
the issue as an election of remedies problem, it stated: ''Whatever doctrinal label is used, the 
essence of [the issue] remains the same. The policy reasons for rejecting the doctrines of elec-
tion of remedies and waiver [in arbitration cases] in the context of title VII are equally applica-
ble to the doctrines ofres judicata and collateral estoppel." 415 U.S at 49 n.10. 
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[T]he legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to 
allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title 
VII and other applicable state and federal statutes. The clear inference 
is that Title VII was designed to supplement, rather than supplant, ex-
isting laws and institutions relating to employment discrimination. 100 
The appellate courts have reasoned that state fair employment prac-
tices laws, like arbitration, operate independently of title VII. Con-
sequently, they have argued, litigating in one forum, be it an 
arbitration hearing or a state evidentiary hearing, does not prevent a 
second forum from hearing the claim.101 
This reading of Gardner-.Denver fails for two reasons. First, un-
like arbitration hearings under collective bargaining agreements ne-
gotiated under the National Labor Relations Act, state fair 
employment practices laws are explicitly incorporated into title VIl's 
enforcement scheme. It may be fair to extend Gardner-.Denver's 
holding to causes of action such as those created by section 1981 or 
Executive Order 11,246, which are outside title VII's purview, but 
the conclusion that the Gardner-.Denver Court's reasoning applies to 
state fair employment proceedings is considerably weaker. Title 
VII's language suggests, 102 and its legislative history confirms, 103 that 
Congress foresaw a unique interdependent relationship between fed-
eral and state enforcement proceedings. 
Second, Gardner-.Denver's rationale applies only weakly, if at all, 
to state administrative or judicial decisions reached after a full evi-
dentiary hearing. The Gardner-.Denver Court was troubled because 
the "choice of forums inevitably affects the scope of the substantive 
right to be vindicated."104 The hallmark of arbitration is the infor-
mality that "enables it to function as an efficient, inexpensive, and 
expeditious means for dispute resolution."105 Arbitral fact-finding 
processes, the Court observed, are not commensurate with judicial 
processes: the record is not as complete, the usual rules of evidence 
do not apply, and civil trial procedures such as discovery, compul-
sory process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath are often 
100. 415 U.S. at 48-49 (footnote omitted). 
IOI. See note 96 supra. 
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976) ("In determining whether reasonable cause exists, 
the Commission shall accord substantial weight to final findings and orders made by state or 
local authorities .... "); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976) (deferral requirement); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-8(b) (1976) (authority for work-sharing agreement between the EEOC and state 
agencies). 
103. See notes 57-94 supra and accompanying text. 
104. 415 U.S. at 56 (quoting United States Bulk Carriers v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 359-60 
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
105. 415 U.S. at 58. 
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severely limited or unavailable. 106 The distinction between contrac-
tual and statutory interpretation also figured prominently in the 
Court's analysis. In stark contrast to a judge, an arbitrator "is con-
fined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining 
agreement"107 and ''has no general authority to invoke public 
laws."108 As the Court succinctly summarized the basis for its deci-
sion: "It is uncertain whether minimal savings in judicial time and 
expense would justify the risk to the vindication of title VII 
rights." 109 
The "risk" of applying res judicata and collateral estoppel princi-
ples to claims adjudicated in full-fledged state evidentiary hearings is 
considerably reduced. Like federal courts, the state tribunals inter-
pret an employee's statutory rights rather than his contractual rights. 
Additionally, full state evidentiary hearings afford greater procedu-
ral protections than arbitration hearings.110 The Gardner-Denver 
Court indicated that where a competent arbitrator considered con-
tractual provisions that substantially conform with title VII in a pro-
cedurally fair manner and developed an adequate record concerning 
discrimination, "a court may properly accord [the arbitrator's] deci-
sion great weight."lll It requires no great leap of logic to conclude 
that decisions rendered by a state tribunal may, in some cases, de-
serve preclusive effect. The Gardner-Denver opinion, taken as a 
whole, is consistent with the application of preclusion principles to 
claims that have been fully and fairly litigated in state deferral 
proceedings.112 
106. 415 U.S. at 56-58. 
107. 415 U.S. at 53 (quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car 
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)). 
108. 415 U.S. at 53. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 101 S. Ct. 1437 
(1981) (claims arbitrated under a collective bargaining agreement may be reasserted in a fed-
eral court action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1976)). 
109. 415 U.S. at 59. 
110. See, e.g., CAL. GOVT. CODE§§ 12930, 12963 (Deering Supp. 1981); 2 CAL. AD. CODE 
§ 7285.6 (1980) (subpoena power, full discovery powers); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 68, ~~ 8-102 
(Supp. 1980) and ILL. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMN. R. PRAC. & PROC. §§ 2, 7, 3 EMPL. PRAC. 
GUIDE (CCH) ~~ 22,475.02 & .07 (1981) (subpoena power, full discovery with modified right 
to depositions); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.548 (602) (1977) (subpoena power, interrogatories, right 
to request documents); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.04 (Page 1980) and OHIO CIVIL 
RIGHTS COMMN. R. AND REG.§§ 4112-3-12 & 13, 3 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE {CCH) ~~ 26,677.12 
& .13 (1979) (full civil powers of subpoena and discovery). Cf. R. OF FLA. COMMN. ON 
HUMAN RELATIONS,§ 9D-8.19, 3 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) ~ 21,829.19 (1980) (discovery 
availability may be limited by hearing officer). 
111, 415 U.S. at 60 n.21. 
112. Cf. Becton v. Detroit Terminal of Consol. Freightways, 490 F. Supp. 464, 468 (E.D. 
Mich. 1980), where the court found that the arbitration process fully protected the employee's 
interests under the collective bargaining agreement. "To rule that the court must consider the 
issue of just cause for termination on a de novo basis in this case would be to needlessly 
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C. The 1972 Amendments 
In 1972, Congress passed an amendment that requires the EEOC 
to give "substantial weight" to the findings of state tribunals. 113 The 
substantial weight directive is not addressed to federal courts, but it 
has been read as implicitly limiting the weight that federal courts 
may give to state decisions. The weight that a federal court assigns 
to state findings admittedly has implications for the standard of def-
erence used by the EEOC. Indeed, the language of the "substantial 
weight" amendment is the linchpin of the Cooper partial deference 
standard.114 If federal courts give state decisions preclusive effect, 
the EEOC, as a practical matter, must do so as well. It would be 
futile for the EEOC to overturn a state decision that is binding on 
the federal courts.115 Some courts have concluded that this result -
effectively requiring the EEOC to attribute preclusive weight to 
some state decisions - violates the intent of the substantial weight 
directive and, hence, have refused to apply preclusion principles.I 16 
This argument possesses an attractive logic, but rests on the 
faulty assumption that the substantial weight provision prescribes 
the maximum weight that the EEOC may accord state findings. This 
assumption might be justified if Congress had enacted the amend-
ment to prevent the EEOC from assigning too much weight to state 
findings. Congress's concerns, however, ran in the opposite direc-
tion. Prior to 1972, the EEOC was free to ignore the determinations 
handed down by state tribunals. 117 The legislative materials con-
cerning the 1972 amendment are rather sparse, 118 but, in light of the 
emasculate the arbitral process and to pass up an opportunity to conserve judicial resources." 
490 F. Supp. at 468. But see Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1975), where the court 
held that federal employees may obtain de novo review of title VII claim in federal courts after 
exhausting federal administrative procedures. The court had no occasion, however, to express 
an opinion on preclusion principles and did not discuss the Act's legislative history on the issue 
as it presumably would have done had it intended to express a view on the question. 
113. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4(a), 86 Stat. 104 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976)). The relevant portion of the amendment states: "In 
determining whether reasonable cause exists, the Commission shall accord substantial weight 
to final findings and orders made by state or local authorities in proceedings commenced 
under State or local law pursuant to [the deferral provision]." 
114. 464 F.2d at 12. 
115. As the Seventh Circuit astutely noted: ''The E.E.O.C .... would be attempting to 
mediate with defendants who were already protected from any further legal action." Batiste v. 
Fumco Constr. Corp., 503 F.2d 447, 450 n.l (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928 (1975). 
l 16. See Batiste v. Fumco Constr. Corp., 503 F.2d at 450; Cooper v. Philip Morris, Inc., 
464 F.2d 9, 12 (6th Cir. 1972). 
117. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(b), 78 Stat. 259-60. 
118. See Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 
1972, 40 GEO.WASH. L. REv. 824, 866-67 n.279 (1972) (Congress's failure to indicate precisely 
its meaning leaves the substantial weight directive "an unknown factor in the law"). 
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policies of respect and cooperation evident in the 1964 Act, 119 it is 
reasonable to infer that Congress thought that the EEOC's freedom 
denigrated the proper role of state enforcement proceedings. During 
the Senate debates on the 1972 amendments, for instance, Senator 
Montoya questioned the purpose of the substantial weight provi-
sion.120 In response, Senator Ervin explained that the provision's 
purpose was to require the EEOC to give "due respect" to the find-
ings of state and local authorities and to guard against peremptory 
reversal by the EEOC.121 Although Senator Ervin was not a sup-
porter of the amendments, his explanation was unquestioned, and 
apparently accepted, 122 by Senator Williams, one of the bill's pri-
mary sponsors. 123 Interpreted in light of its purpose, the substantial 
weight directive would seem to state only the minimum weight that 
the EEOC must give to state findings, not an implicit maximum. 
This conclusion becomes quite compelling when one considers 
the varied character of state decisions. The 1972 amendments 
clearly command the EEOC to accord at least substantial weight to 
all state decisions. Yet the thoroughness and quality of state pro-
ceedings vary substantially - ranging from purely administrative 
investigations performed by understaffed state agencies to full-scale 
adversarial litigations conducted before highly qualified administra-
tive tribunals and courts. 124 Reading the substantial weight directive 
as implicitly limiting the weight that the EEOC may give to state 
decisions appears unreasonable because that interpretation prevents 
the EEOC from distinguishing among the various types of state de-
terminations. The more natural reading of the provision is that the 
EEOC must attribute substantial weight to mere investigative find-
119. See notes 82-94 supra and accompanying text. 
120. 118 CONG. REC. 309-10 (1972). 
121. 118 CONG. REC. 310 (1972). 
122. Although silence usually might not imply acquiescence, Senator Montoya directed his 
question to both Senators Williams and Ervin. 118 CONG. REC. 309-10 (1972) (remarks of 
Sen. Montoya). Moreover, Senator Williams freely co=ented on and corrected Senator Er-
vin's understanding of the bill both before and after Senator Ervin's explanation of the sub-
stantial weight directive. See 118 CONG. REc. 308-12 (1972). 
123. Senator Williams was floor manager of the Senate version of the 1972 amendments, 
118 CONG. REc. 583 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams), and served on the House-Senate con-
ference committee, 118 CONG. REc. 6646 (1972) (conference report). 
124. See Rosen, supra note 11, at 775-81; Witherspoon, Civil Rights in the Federal System: 
Proposals for a Better Use of Administrative Process, 74 YALE L.J. 1171, 1184-205 (1965); Title 
VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964: Present Operation and Proposals far Improvement, 5 COLUM. J.L. 
& Soc. PROB. l, 12-13 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Present Operation J; Note, The Right of Equal 
Treatment: Adminstrative Enforcement of Antidiscrimination Legislation, 74 HARv. L. REv. 526 
(1961); notes 8, 11 supra and accompanying text; notes 187-92 infra and accompanying text. 
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ings of state agencies, but it may accord greater weight to decisions 
rendered after a full and fair litigation. 
Other statements made during the Senate debates further corrob-
orate this interpretation. Expressing concern over "the possibility of 
a multiplicity of actions"125 for each alleged violation, Senator 
Hruska submitted an amendment that, with certain exceptions, 
would have made title VII the only federal remedy in employment 
discrimination cases.126 Although the proposed amendment would 
not have barred proceedings in state agencies, 127 the concerns that 
Senator Hruska sought to address included the confusion, expense, 
and delay involved in litigating the same discrimination claim in 
both state and federal proceedings.128 In response, Senator Javits, 
one of the principal proponents of the 1972 amendments, stated his 
belief that preclusion principles rendered Senator Hruska's concerns 
inapplicable: 
Furthermore, there is the real capability in this situation of dealing 
with the question on the basis of res judicata. In other words, once 
there is a litigation - a litigation started by the Commission, a litiga-
tion started by the Attorney General, or a litigation started by the indi-
vidual - the remedy has been chosen and can be followed through 
and no relitigation of the same issues in a different forum would be 
permitted. 129 
125. 118 CONG. REc. 3368 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Hruska). 
126. Senator Hruska's amendment proposed as follows: 
AMENDMENT NO. 877 
After subsection 4(e), of page 38, line 6, the following new subsection (f) is added; 
subsection (f) of S. 2515 and all succeeding subsections are redesignated as appropriate: 
(f) Except as provided in subsection (b) through (e), (n) and (q) of this section, section 
707 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (78 Stat. 255; 42 U.S.C. 2000e-6), as amended, and the 
Equal Pay Act of 1963 (29 U.S.C. 206(d)(l)), a charge filed hereunder shall be the exclu-
sive remedy of any person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful employment practice 
of an employer, employment agency, or labor organization. 
118 CONG. REC. 3173 (1972) {remarks of Sen. Hruska). 
127. Senator Hruska's amendment excepted state deferral proceedings from its general 
rule that filings with the EEOC exclude legal remedies under other statutes. See 118 CoNO. 
REc. 3369 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Hruska). The amendment also excepted proceedings under 
the Equal Pay Act and§ 707 pattern and practice suits instituted by the Attorney General. Id 
128. See 118 CONG. REC. 3172-73 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Hruska). Senator Hruska ob-
served that an aggrieved employee may file with the state fair employment practice agency, 
which typically has authority to obtain the employer's records, correspondence, and papers. 
After 60 days, he noted, "the EEOC can move in with a similar demand for records and 
documents." Senator Hruska continued: "Even after the State agency dismisses the com-
plaint, the EEOC can move in and file a complaint . . . . If the EEOC dismisses the com-
plaint, or it takes no action within 6 months, then the respondent may file suit under title VII." 
Id at 3368. 
129. 118 CoNG. REC. 3370 (1972). Arguably, Senator Javits's co=ents could be inter-
preted to apply, like Senator Hruska's amendment, only to extra-title VII suits such as§ 1981 
or National Labor Relations Act "fair representation" suits. While plausible, this interpreta-
tion seems unlikely because Senator Javits was answering concerns that encompassed stale 
deferral proceedings. See note 128 supra. Even if Javits was addressing only the relationship 
between title VII proceedings and NLRB,§ 1981, or Executive Order 11,246 proceedings, his 
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Echoing Senator Javits's remarks, Senator Williams, a sponsor of the 
amendments, endorsed application of preclusion principles to com-
plaints previously decided in another forum: "[I] do not believe that 
the individual claimant should be allowed to litigate his claim to 
completion in one forum, and then if dissatisfied, go to another fo-
rum to try again .... " 130 After Senators Javits and Williams 
spoke, an evenly divided Senate refused to approve the proposed 
amendment. 131 The statements of these two Senators, both advo-
cates of the 1972 amendments, support two important conclusions. 
First, they impliedly suggest that the substantial weight directive 
does not limit the weight that the EEOC can accord state findings. 
Second, and more important, they indicate that Congress perceived 
no inconsistency between the substantial weight provision and the 
availability of preclusion doctrines. 
The purposes and history of the 1972 amendments reveal that the 
substantial weight directive does not implicitly restrict a federal 
court's authority to apply res judicata or collateral estoppel princi-
ples to the decisions of state tribunals. In fact, the remarks of Sena-
tors Javits and Williams add credence to this Article's conclusion 
that the 1964 Act is consistent with and, in fact, contemplates the 
application of preclusion doctrines. 132 
endorsement of preclusion rules would apply a fortiori to state and federal title VII proceed-
ings. AsA/exander v. Gardner-lJenver Co. illustrates, the issue of whether preclusion principles 
may be applied to civil rights claims outside the ambit of title VII is difficult because of "a 
congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title 
VII and other applicable state and federal statutes." 415 U.S. at 48. It is much easier to apply 
preclusion principles to the findings of title VII state deferral agencies or courts. Rather than 
arguably compromising the independence of civil rights claims, application of preclusion rules 
enhances the interdependent, cooperative and respectful relationship between state and federal 
title VII enforcement efforts. See notes 82-94 supra & 160-201 i,fra and accompanying text. 
130. 118 CONG. REC. 3372 (1972). For a discussion of how these remarks should be inter-
preted, see note 129 supra. 
131. 118 CONG. REC. 3372-73 (1972). Because Senator Hruska's amendment was defeated 
on a tie vote, the co=ents of Senators Javits and Williams are not as authoritative as they 
might otherwise be. Even if all Senators who voted against the amendment did so because, 
agreeing with Senators Javits and Williams, they believed that preclusion principles rendered 
the amendment unnecessary, courts still lack complete assurance that a majority of the Senate 
held this view. This inference, however, is more plausible than it might first appear. Many 
Senators might have agreed with Senators Javits's and Williams's remarks but voted for Sena-
tor Hruska's amendment anyway. These Senators might have reasoned that the amendment 
was more certain to prevent needless relitigation because courts, lacking clear guidance, might 
mistakenly hold preclusion principles unavailable in title VII suits. 
Even though this legislative history is not ideal, it is the best available. It is especially 
illuminating that Senator Williams, a sponsor of the 1972 amendments and a member of the 
Senate-House conference committee, endorsed application of preclusion rules. See, e.g., Na-
tional Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. NLRB, 386 U.S 612, 640 (1967) (quoting Schwegmann Bros. 
v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951) ("It is the sponsors that we look to 
when the meaning of the statutory words is in doubt.")). 
132. In construing a statute, courts have questioned the weight that they should attribute to 
statements made by legislators well after the statute's enactment. See Note, Implying a Cause 
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D. Title VII's Enforcement Scheme 
Title VII's federal enforcement proceedings are designed to mesh 
"nicely, logically, and coherently with state and city legislation al-
ready in existence .... " 133 To remain faithful to this intent, fed-
eral courts should fashion standards of deference to state decisions 
that promote a harmonious, efficient, and balanced relationship be-
tween state and federal enforcement efforts. 
In Batiste v. Furnco Construction Corp. , 134 the Seventh Circuit ar-
gued that application of preclusion principles would impair the effi-
cacy of state proceedings, and distort title VII's federal/state 
enforcement scheme.135 According to the Batiste court, the knowl-
edge that federal courts would give res judicata and collateral estop-
pel effect to state decisions would induce complainants who desire a 
federal forum to "first commence state proceedings but abandon 
them quickly before an adjudication is made." 136 This argument is 
vulnerable to several criticisms. 
A complainant's incentive to abandon state proceedings will de-
pend on the content of the preclusion rules that federal courts apply. 
If, like the Second Circuit in Sinicropi v. Nassau County, 137 courts 
adopt a rule that accords preclusive weight to almost all final state 
decisions, the incentive might be substantial. Under the standard 
proposed in this Article, however, whether the complainant's claim is 
barred hinges on the sufficiency of the rights, remedies, and proce-
dures provided by the state. 138 This rule would significantly reduce 
of Action Under Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 19 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1105 
n.60, 1109-10 & nn.79-82 (1981). Above all, courts want some assurance that a majority of the 
earlier Congress shared the legislators' subsequently expressed views. Where evidence that a 
majority of the subsequent Congress endorsed the views is lacking, it is less likely that those 
views commanded majority support in the earlier Congress. See id. at 110 n.81 and cases cited 
therein. Thus, doubts that Senator Javits's and Williams's statements reflected the understand-
ing of the 1972 Congress, see note 131 supra, bear on whether courts may rely upon those 
remarks in interpreting title VII as originally enacted. But, as those statements deserve some 
weight in inferring the 1972 Congress's intent, see note 131 supra, they also illuminate the 1964 
Congress's intent. Courts have attributed significance to subsequent statements made by legis-
lators involved in the development of the original legislation. See, e.g., Pierce & Stevens 
Chem. Corp. v. United States Consumer Prod. Safety Commn., 585 F.2d 1382, 1387 n.23 (2d 
Cir. 1978). Both Senator Javits and Senator Williams participated in the 1964 debates on title 
VII. See 110 CONG. REC. 362-63 (1964) (index) (page citations to Sen. Javits's remarks on title 
VII); id. at 739 (index) (page citations to Sen. Williams's remarks on title VII). 
133. 110 CONG. REc. 7205 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark). See New York Gaslight Club, 
Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 63-64 (1980); note 86 supra. 
134. 503 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928 (1975). 
135. 503 F.2d at 450. 
136. 503 F.2d at 450. 
137. 601 F.2d 60 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 983 (1979). 
138. See Part III infra. 
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the incentive to flee to federal court. 
This Article's preclusion rule would induce complainants to 
abandon state proceedings only if they fear that state tribunals will 
misread facts or misinterpret substantive law. 139 Yet, as we have 
seen, Congress expressed no doubts concerning the competence of 
state authorities. 140 Such doubts, therefore, cannot justify restricting 
the deference that federal courts owe to state decisions that have 
been fully and fairly litigated. Although the Batiste court's rule is 
ostensibly designed to enhance federal/state cooperation, it reveals a 
fundamental mistrust of the state systems that is at odds with title 
VII's policies of respect and deference. 
Even assuming that federal courts may properly consider fears 
that state tribunals are incompetent or hostile to civil rights, one 
wonders what a no-preclusion rule will achieve. Although such a 
rule may not cause complainants to abandon state proceedings, it 
might, ironically, deter them in some circumstances from seeking 
federal court review of state decisions. The Supreme Court's Gas-
light Club opinion emphasized that where state remedies fall short of 
those provided by title VII, Congress made the federal courts avail-
able to grant additional relief. 141 Without the benefit of collateral 
estoppel rules, however, a complainant might hesitate to avail him-
139. Depending on one's jurisprudence, the text's assertion may misstate the argument. If 
one believes that generally there is one "correct" result in each case, then the assertion in the 
text is accurate. One might believe, however, that there is a range of equally reasonable results 
in each case. If so, it might be more accurate to say that complainants will abandon the state 
system because they fear more conservative results. Even if phrased in this way, the argument 
advanced in the text still stands. As against the Second Circuit's rule, this Article's preclusion 
rule significantly reduces the complainant's incentive to abandon state proceedings. Further-
more, Congress did not design access to federal courts to correct "conservative" state results. 
Courts should not ignore congressional policies of state/federal cooperation and respect by 
legitimizing fears that states will reach conservative results. 
140. Congress wished to ensure the consistency of state and federal law and the procedural 
fairness of state decisions. The predominant attitude toward state laws and tribunals was one 
of respect and deference. See notes 82-94 supra and accompanying text. 
It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court has recently given the states an increased 
role in protecting individual liberties guaranteed by federal law. See Allen v. Mccurry, 101 S. 
Ct. 411 (1980); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
Cf. Sumner v. Mata, 101 S. Ct. 764, 770 (1981): 
State judges as well as federal judges swear allegiance to the Constitution of the United 
States, and there is no reason to think that because of their frequent differences of opinion as to how that document should be interpreted that all are not doing their mortal best to 
discharge their oath of office. 
Various co=entators have applauded this trend. See Aldisert, State Courts and Federalism in 
the 1980's: Comment, 22 WM. & MARYL. R.Ev. 821, 845 (1981); O'Connor, Trends in the 
Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts From the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 
22 WM. & MARYL. REv. 801, 814-15 (1981) ("It is a step in the right direction to defer to the 
state courts and give finality to their judgments on federal constitutional questions where a full 
and fair adjudication has been given in the state court".) (emphasis in original). 
141. See notes 87-91 supra and accompanying text. 
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self of this opportunity because he fears that the federal court will 
retry his entire claim and reach a different result. A no-preclusion 
rule thus possesses no real advantage over this Article's rule. 
In fact, a no-preclusion rule creates an additional distortion. Ex-
ercising authority granted by section 709(b) of the Act, 142 the EEOC 
routinely enters into work-sharing agreements with state agencies to 
divide responsibility for acting on charges. 143 Despite title VIl's 
deferral clause, some charges are thus channeled directly into the 
federal system. Because the EEOC lacks formal enforcement pow-
ers, these complainants have only one opportunity to argue their case 
in a formal adversarial setting. Complainants whose claims are ini-
tially considered by a state agency, however, might have two oppor-
tunities to argue their case formally - one before a state tribunal 
and another in federal court. This windfall opportunity for a full 
relitigation detracts from the rationality of title VII's enforcement 
scheme. 
Besides enhancing the fairness and symmetry of title VII's en-
forcement procedures, this Article's preclusion rule also promotes ef-
ficiency. Whether or not the state decision is ultimately vindicated, 
relitigation of a claim that has already been fully and fairly tried 
involves substantial costs: The parties, lawyers, and courts must all 
expend considerable time, money, and energy. Unfortunately, this 
costly duplication is largely without purpose. By establishing the 
dual enforcement structure, Congress merely sought to ensure that 
each complainant has an opportunity formally to present his case, 144 
142. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(b) (1976): 
The Co=ission may cooperate with State and local agencies charged with the admin-
istration of State fair employment practices laws and, with the consent of such agencies, 
may, for the purpose of carrying out its functions and duties under this subchapter and 
within the limitation of funds appropriated specifically for such purpose, engage in and 
contribute to the cost of research and other projects of mutual interest undertaken by such 
agencies, and utilize the services of such agencies and their employees, and, notwithstand-
ing any other provision oflaw, pay by advance or reimbursement such agencies and their 
employees for services rendered to assist the Commission in carrying out this subchapter. 
In furtherance of such cooperative efforts, the Commission may enter into written agree-
ments with such State or local agencies and such agreements may include provisions 
under which the Commission shall refrain from processing a chaq;e in any cases or class 
of cases specified in such agreements or under which the Com.mission sliall relieve any 
person or class of persons in such State or locality from requirements imposed under this 
section. The Commission shall rescind any such agreement whenever it determines that 
the agreement no longer serves the interest of effective enforcement of this subchapter. 
The confidence that the EEOC has in the ability of state agencies to resolve charges is 
demonstrated by its proposed regulations that would dispense with its substantial weight re-
view in many cases. See 46 Fed. Reg. 37,523-24 (1981) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1601) 
(proposed July 21, 1981). 
143. See Present Operations, note 124 supra, at 17. 
144. See 110 CONG. REc. 7205 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark) (expressing the concern that 
"inadequate procedures" hampered the efficacy of state enforcement efforts). Congress's judg-
ment that the informal procedures employed by the EEOC must be supplemented with a right 
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and that state decisions conform to title VII's substantive and reme-
dial standards.145 An appropriately formulated preclusion rule can 
address Congress's overriding concern at considerably less expense. 
In contrast to the Cooper substantial weight standard, which permits 
relitigation of all claims, a rational preclusion doctrine would pre-
serve judicial resources by barring relitigation of "adequate" state 
decisi5ms. This concern for efficiency may be rationally imputed to 
Congress. Courts should not hesitate to choose the most efficient 
paths where, as here, other congressional policies are not sacrificed. 
E. Summary 
Neither title VIl's legislative history nor its purpose provides an 
"affirmative showing" that Congress intended to override section 
1738. Rather, the available indicators of Congress's intent suggest 
that applying preclusion principles to decisions rendered by state 
tribunals under the deferral provision is consistent with, and re-
quired by, title VII's state/federal enforcement scheme. This conclu-
sion necessitates the development of general guidelines for the 
application of preclusion principles in title VII litigation, a task that 
this Article undertakes in Part III. 
Ill. TITLE VII PRECLUSION PRINCIPLES 
The broad contours of preclusion doctrines are easily described. 
Res judicata146 or, more recently, "claim preclusion"147 bars relitiga-
tion of an entire cause of action that was or should have been previ-
ously litigated.148 Collateral estoppel149 or "issue preclusion,"150 in 
to a de novo trial in federal court, see note 8 supra, also reveals a concern for procedural 
formality and fairness. 
145. 110 CONG. REC. 12,725, 13,091 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); 110 CONG. REc. 
13,091 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen). Section 1104 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
applies to title VII, states: 
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating an intent on 
the part of Congress to occupy the field in which any such title operates to the exclusion of 
State laws on the same subject matter, nor shall any provision of this Act be construed as 
invalidating any provision of State law unless such provision is inconsistent with any of 
the purposes of this Act, or any provision thereof. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, Title XI,§ 1104, 78 Stat. 268. 
146. See, e.g., 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1J 0.405[3], at 631-35 (2d ed. 1980). But see 
Holland, Modernizing Res Judicata: Reflections on the Parklane .Doctrine, 55 IND. L.J. 615, 615 
n.2 (1980) (arguing that Professor Moore does not appropriately use the term "res judicata"). 
147. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 74 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976). The 
same doctrine has also been termed "merger and bar." See Vestal, Res Judicata/ Preclusion, in 
PERSONAL INJURY ANNUAL V-43 to V-48 (L. Fromer & M. Friedman eds. 1969). 
148. In the words of the Court, claim preclusion requires that a judgment, 
if rendered upon the merits, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action. It is a 
finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity 
with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat 
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contrast, attributes preclusive weight to factual or legal conclusions 
concerning issues that were actually and necessarily litigated in prior 
proceedings. 151 These simple formulations, however, understate the 
complexity of the two doctrines. Modem courts have transformed 
the once ·fixed and easily ascertainable rules of preclusion into a fluid 
and richly textured equitable doctrine designed to attain "substantial 
justice" in particular cases.152 Title VII's dual enforcement scheme 
and the wide variations among state fair employment practices laws 
further complicate the application of these already sophisticated 
principles. Although this Article obviously cannot attempt to apply 
preclusion principles to all possible variations, it does attempt to out-
line the central features of a title VII preclusion doctrine. 
It is first necessary to consider whether state or federal law deter-
mines the content of the applicable preclusion rules. The language 
of section 1738 directs attention to the law of the state that rendered 
the first decision, stating that federal courts must give state decisions 
the "same full faith and credit" as they would be given "by law or 
usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which 
they are taken." 153 But section 1738's command does not rigidly 
confine federal courts to state law. Although the statute uses the 
term "same," the weight of authority suggests that federal courts 
may assign greater weight to a state decision than would the render-
ing state.154 Because•state decisions receive at least the deference that 
they would be accorded by the state's own courts, this greater defer-
the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered 
for that purpose. 
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876). See Allen v. Mccurry, 101 S. Ct. 411, 
414-15 (1980). For an excellent discussion and analysis of the res judicata doctrine, see 
Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741 (1976); Hazard, Res Nova in Res Judicata, 
44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1036 (1971). 
149. See 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE§ 0.441[2], at 3375-80 (2d ed. 1980). 
150. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 74 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976). 
151. As the Court stated the doctrine in Cromwell v. County of Sac: "[T)he judgment in 
the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, 
upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered." 94 U.S. 351, 353 
(1876). See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 
U.S. 322 (1978); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University oflll. Foundation, 402 U.S. 
313 (1971); Fernandez v. Trias Monge, 586 F.2d 848, 856 & n.11 {1st Cir. 1978); RESTATEMENT· 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS,§§ 68, 68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977). 
152. See generally George, Sweet Uses of Adversity: Parklane Hosiery and the Collateral 
Class Action, 32 STAN. L. REV. 655 (1980); Holland, supra note 146,passim; Vestal, Res Judi-
cata Preclusion: Expansion, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 357 (1974). 
153. 28 u.s.c. § 1738 (1976). 
154. See, e.g., Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 109 (1963) ("at least the res judicata effect 
which the judgment would be accorded in the State which rendered it"); Williams v. Ocean 
Transp. Lines, Inc., 425 F.2d 1183, 1389 (3d Cir. 1970) ("Section 1738 does not prohibit the 
second federal court from affording to the first judgment a greater precluding effect than would 
be afforded by the laws of the first forum state."); Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion by Judgment: 
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ence does not undermine section 1738's dual policies of comity and 
efficiency. 155 
Federal courts may also override state rules of repose where nec-
essary to further competing federal policies. 156 As one court has suc-
cinctly stated: "The application of state law we approve today is 
state law wrapped in a cocoon of federal law governing the degree of 
adherence to state law - not unequivocal application of naked state 
law."157 In Allen v. Mccurry, the Supreme Court recognized the 
need to develop preclusion rules that accommodate specific federal 
policies, but required that any exception to these rules be based on a 
clear expression of legislative intent to override section 1738.158 A 
perceived policy exception is the basis for all court holdings that em-
ployment discrimination cases may properly be litigated twice. But 
as demonstrated above, this Cooper premise is unsupportable under 
the Allen Court's guidelines. Absent an explicit policy exception to 
section 1738, the only limits on the federal courts' deference to prior 
state determinations in title VII cases are "essentially the same as 
17,e Law Applied in Federal Courts, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1723, 1736-39 (1968) (It "seems to be the 
case" that "the [full faith and credit] clause establishes only a minimum"). 
155. Federal courts thus should not consider themselves bound by the sometimes archaic 
limitations that pervade state formulation of preclusion doctrines. See, e.g., Parker v. 
McKeithen, 488 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974) (res judicata applied 
despite absence of Louisiana recognition of this principle); Williams v. Ocean Transp. Lines, 
Inc., 425 F.2d at 1190 (federal interest overrides state's mutuality requirement); Paul v. Dade 
County, 419 F.2d IO (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 1065 (1970) (claim barred as to party 
not named in prior suit). But see McCune v. Frank, 521 F.2d 1152 (2d Cir. 1975) (strict appli-
cation of state preclusion law required). See generally Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. 
University oflll. Foundation, Inc., 402 U.S. 313, 320-27 (1971) (discussion of state divergence 
regarding mutuality requirement in collateral estoppel). The Supreme Court in recent years 
has taken significant steps to liberalize the principles of preclusion in federal courts, see, e.g., 
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 154 (1979) (nonparty who assumed control over prior 
litigation estopped); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332-33 (1979) (on facts 
before the Court, offensive use of collateral estoppel by nonparty approved); Blonder-Tongue 
Laboratories v. University oflll. Foundation, Inc., 402 U.S. at 350 (defensive use of collateral 
estoppel by nonparty approved), and this liberalization should be effective in all federal ques-
tion cases, cf. Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946) ("It has been held in non-diversity 
cases, since Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, that the federal courts will apply their own rule of res 
judicata ."). 
156. See, e.g., Mitchell v. NBC, 553 F.2d 265, 274 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting American Man-
nex Corp. v. Rozands, 462 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972)). Cases 
decided without reference to § 1738 have also held that strong federal policies may override 
traditional common-law rules of preclusion. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 
(1948) (federal tax policy may dictate limited application of collateral estoppel to state decision 
on federal tax liability); Red Fox v. Red Fox, 564 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1977) (unique historical 
relationship between the American Indian and federal government may require variation in 
application of res judicata). See generally Note, Res Judicata: Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction 
and the Effect ef Prior Stale Court .Determinations, 53 VA. L. REV. 1360 (1967). 
157. American Mannex Corp. v. Rozands, 462 F.2d 688, 691 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 
U.S. 1040 (1972). See Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1978); Ohland v. City of 
Montpelier, 467 F. Supp. 324, 336-37 (D. Vt. 1979). 
158. 101 S. Ct at 416-18. 
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important general limits on rules of preclusion that already 
[exist]."159 
A. Identity of Claims: Ensuring the Consistency 
of Federal and State Law 
The debates on title VII reveal that Congress recognized the need 
for consistency between federal and state law. 16° Federal courts can 
achieve the consistency that Congress desired by using preclusion 
doctrines judiciously. Res judicata effect may be given to a decision 
only if there is an "identity of claims" between prior and subsequent 
proceedings.161 Courts have defined "identical claim" in a number 
of ways, 162 but the ultimate inquiry remains whether the claim as-
serted in the second forum was or should have been litigated in the 
first forum. 163 Where state law falls short of federal law on substan-
tive issues, res judicata does not apply; not all issues could, much less 
should, have been litigated in the state proceeding. 164 
159. IOI S. Ct. at 418. 
160. See note 145 supra. 
161. See, e.g., Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U.S. 502, 508-09 
(1941); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Kirtley, 338 F.2d 1006, lOll (8th Cir. 1964); Sims v. Mack 
Trucks, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 1068, 1069 (E.D. Pa. 1979). 
162. See, e.g., Hanson v. Hunt Oil Co., SOS F.2d 1237, 1240 (8th Cir. 1974) (''whether the 
wrong for which redress is sought is the same in both actions"); Rhodes v. Meyer, 334 F.2d 709 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 915 (1964) (whether same right is infringed by same wrong). 
See also Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 516 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1975) ("There is no one 
test for deciding whether the substances of two actions are the same for purposes of res judi-
cata."). See generally lB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 0.410[1], at 98-107 (2d ed. 1980-
1981); 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 31, § 4407. 
163. J. LANDERS & J. MARTIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 885 (1981). 
164. See, e.g., Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 982-85 (5th Cir. 1979) (state court action 
did not preclude subsequent federal action because state court did not have jurisdiction to 
consider the alleged federal violations arising out of the incident in question), cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 1078 (1980). See generally 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 31, 
§ 4412, at 97. The assertion that the complainant cannot raise federal title VII-based claims in 
state proceedings assumes that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction to interpret title VIl's 
substantive law. Some courts, however, have held that state courts have concurrent jurisdic-
tion over title VII-based claims. See Peterson v. Eastern Airlines, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 
1322, 1323 (W.D. Tex. 1979); Bennun v. Board of Governors, 413 F. Supp. 1274 (D.N.J. 1976); 
Vason v. Carrano, 31 Conn. Supp. 338,330 A.2d 98 (Super. Ct. 1974). But see Lucas v. Tanner 
Bros. Contracting Co., 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. ll04 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. 1974); Fox v. Eaton 
Corp., 48 Ohio St. 2d 236, 358 N.E.2d 536 (1976). If states may legitimately decide title VII-
based claims, then one can argue that state decisions should preclude subs~guent title VII 
actions in federal court - the complainant should have raised his title VII claun in the state 
proceeding. 
This mechanical argument and its premise of concurrent state/federal jurisdiction must be 
rejected as inconsistent with Congress's intent. The statute is designed to allow the complain-
ant access to the federal system after a state decision. The legislative history conclusively 
demonstrates that this access was meant to ensure that where state law was inconsistent with or 
not as complete as federal law, federal law should prevail. See Part II.A supra. Both the 
statute's structure and legislative history reflect Congress's assumption that this task should be 
entrusted to federal courts. 
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At the most general level, title VII's deferral provision limits the 
possible differences between federal and state law. The EEOC may 
only defer to states that have "a law prohibiting the unlawful prac-
tice alleged."165 One might argue that the overlap between state and 
federal law that the deferral provision requires should conclusively 
establish an identity of claims. Closer scrutiny of the required simi-
larity, however, discloses several circumstances in which separate 
claims may exist despite the fact of deferral. 
The sometimes broader scope of state law raises the possibility 
that state proceedings may not address the title VII issue. For in-
stance, some states prohibit marital discrimination in addition to sex 
discrimination.166 The prior state proceeding thus may have only 
applied the state's law on marital discrimination, even though the 
matters alleged might also support a charge of sex discrimination. 
The complainant should be able to litigate a sex discrimiriation 
claim not presented in the state forum. 167 
Res judicata effect should also be denied where claims based on 
title VII could not have been raised in the state proceeding. First, 
deferral to a state that defines ''unlawful" discrimination more re-
strictively than does title VII should not preclude a complainant 
from taking advantage of the greater protection that title VII affords. 
It is possible, for example, that a state may use a restrictive intent 
standard to define unlawful discrimination.168 But this situation 
is uncommon. Some states have expressly embraced title VII's 
disparate impact standard, 169 others look to title VII for guid-
165. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976). 
166. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, ~ l-103(Q) (1980); MICH. STAT. ANN.§ 3.548(202) (Supp. 
1981); CAL. GOVT. CODE§ 12940 (Deering Supp. 1981). Several variations of the same theme 
are possible. In addition to the traditional bases, some states prohibit discrimination based on 
mental illness,see CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 17-206 (1981); nepotism,see OR. REV. STAT.§ 659.340 
(1979); or sexual preference, see D.C. CODE§ l-320e (Supp. V 1978). 
167. See note 161 supra and accompanying text. Because res judicata bars not only claims 
that were raised, but also those that might have been, litigation of claims not raised in the first 
forum should be permitted only when the complainant did not have the opportunity or was 
affirmatively barred from raising the claims in the first instance. 
A related problem arises when a federal administrative determination under a separate 
federal statute is used to preclude a subsequent title VII claim or where a state administrative 
determination regarding employment discrimination is set forth as a bar to a federal claim 
other than under title VII. In both cases preclusion may be appropriate if the bases of the 
subsequent suit could have been or were litigated as part of the prior proceeding. Compare 
Mitchell v. NBC, 553 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1977) (state employment discrimination proceeding 
bars suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981), with Tipler v. E. I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 
(6th Cir. 1971) (NLRB finding did not bar title VII claim because issues asserted in each 
proceeding were different). 
168. See Duffy v. Physicians Ins. Co., 191 Neb. 223, 214 N.W.2d 471 (1974). q. Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (adopting an intent standard under the fourteenth amend-
ment of the Federal Constitution). 
169. See, e.g., Iowa Dept. of Social Servs. v. Iowa Merit Employment Dept., 13 Fair Empl. 
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ance,170and several employ evidentiary standards that are more leni-
ent than title VIl's. 171 Except for the rare circumstance where state 
law is more restrictive, federal courts are barred from conducting a 
de novo hearing. 
There is a second, more common situation in which important 
title VII rights cannot be fully litigated in state deferral proceedings: 
federal and state remedial stand~rds often differ. Some of the state 
agencies to which complaints are deferred under section 706(c) are 
not authorized to file suit, 172 obtain full monetary relief, 173 or pro-
vide attorneys' fees. 174 The unavailability of certain forms of re-
lief, 175 however, does not justify the adoption of a no-preclusion rule. 
Although a court adopting traditional preclusion rules would not 
permit relitigation of the merits of claims, 176 it would allow com-
plainants to seek forms of relief authorized by title VII but unavaila-
ble in state proceedings. Not only would these rules enhance the 
coordination of the federal/state enforcement scheme, 177 but they 
would do so in a manner that is consistent with the Gaslight Club 
Court's understanding that federal courts should be made available 
Prac. Cas. 1332 (Iowa Dist. Ct. 1976); Giles v. Family Court of Delaware, 411 A.2d 599 (Del. 
1980); Maine Human Rights Commn. v. City of Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253 (Me. L. Ct. 1979), 
qffd, 425 A.2d 990 (Me. 1980). 
170. See, e.g., Narragansett Co. v. Rhode Island Commn. for Human Rights, 118 R.I. 457, 
374 A.2d 1022 (1977); Civil Rights Commn. v. Chrysler Corp., 80 Mich. App. 368, 263 N.W.2d 
376 (1977); City of Cairo v. Fair Employment Practices Commn., 21 Ill. App. 3d 358, 315 
N.E.2d 344 (1974). 
171. See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human 
Relations, 87 Wis. 2d 56, 273 N.W.2d 786 (1978). 
172. See, e.g., EEOC v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 420 F. Supp. 244, 254 (D. Md. 
1976) (applying Florida law). 
173. See, e.g., White v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 581 F.2d 556, 560 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(applying Texas law); Crosslin v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 422 F.2d 1028, 1030-31 (9th 
Cir. 1970), vacated, 400 U.S. 1004 (1971) (applying Arizona law); EEOC v. Union Bank, 408 
F.2d 867, 869-70 (9th Cir. 1968) (applying California law). 
174. See, e.g., New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 67-68 (1980) (applying 
New York law). 
175. State discrimination remedies may be inadequate in another way. Where the state 
has not established a civil enforcement scheme, charges may be referred to the stale for crimi-
nal proceedings. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-S(c) (1976) (where state law prohibits the employment 
practice alleged, EEOC must defer to state entity authorized to institute criminal proceedings). 
Acquittal of the respondent should not preclude a putative complainant from bringing a civil 
action because the discriminatee is not a party to the state criminal proceeding, the penal 
remedy does not provide the monetary compensation or reinstatement sought by the complain-
ant, and the burden of proof is more demanding in criminal proceedings. A respondent, on 
the other hand, may be bound on issues actually litigated in such prior proceedings. Cf. Allen 
v. Mccurry, IOI S. Ct. 411, 419-20 (1980) (holding that federal courts addressing§ 1983 consti-
tutional claims must give collateral estoppel effect to same claim fully and fairly litigated in a 
state criminal proceeding. 
176. See notes 148-51 supra and accompanying text. 
177. See Part 11.D supra. 
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only to supplement inadequate state remedies. 178 
Federal courts should not give res judicata effect to state deci-
sions unless the overlap between federal and state law with respect to 
the relevant claims and relief is fairly complete. The inappropriate-
ness of res judicata in a particular case, however, usually will not 
justify a de novo relitigation of every issue in that case. Congres-
sional deference to state authority and collateral estoppel 179 compel 
federal courts to accept the state's findings on legal or factual issues 
actually and necessarily litigated in the state proceeding. 
B. Full and Fair Litigation: Procedural Fairness 
The preclusive effect of a state's resolution of a particular issue or 
an entire claim does not depend solely on consistency between state 
and federal law. The quality, extensiveness, and objectivity of the 
procedures followed in the prior litigation also play important roles. 
The Supreme Court in Allen v. Mccurry stated the proper view: 
"Collateral estoppel does not apply where the party against whom 
an earlier court decision is asserted did not have a full and fair op-
portunity to litigate the claim or issue decided by the first court."180 
The Allen Court, interpreting section 1983, recognized that the full 
and fair opportunity requirement is especially compelling where, as 
is true of title VII, the proponents of the statute that created the 
cause of action sought to ensure procedural adequacy. 181 
Although no talismanic formula exists to determine whether a 
complainant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim, the 
safeguards generally required in adversarial proceedings are useful 
indicators. In deciding whether to give preclusive weight to prior 
proceedings, courts have been influenced by the presence of the right 
to counsel, 182 the right to present evidence, 183 the right to cross-ex-
178. See notes 87-90 supra and accompanying text. 
179. See notes 149-51 supra and accompanying text. 
180. 101 s. Ct. at 418. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88(2) (Tent. Draft 
No. 2, 1975) (preclusion does not apply where "[t]he forum in the second action affords the 
party against whom preclusion is asserted procedural opportunities in the presentation and 
determination of the issue that were not available in the first action and that might likely result 
in the issue's being differently determined"). 
181. 101 S. Ct. at 418. 
182. See H.L. Robertson & Assocs. v. Plumbers Local 519, 429 F.2d 520, 521 (5th Cir. 
1970) (per curiam); Painters Dist. Council No. 38 v. Edgewood Contracting Co., 416 F.2d 
1081, 1084 (5th Cir. 1969). 
183. See Painters Dist. Council No. 38 v. Edgewood Contracting Co., 416 F.2d at 1084; 
Groom v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 344 F. Supp. at 1002. Cf. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver 
Co., 415 U.S. at 57-58 (absence of rules of evidence reason to deny preclusive effect to arbitral 
decisions). 
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amination, 184 evidentiary guidelines, 185 and discovery procedures. 186 
By considering these factors, one can reasonably distinguish between 
investigatory findings and decisions made after full evidentiary 
hearings. 
State agencies, like the EEOC, typically investigate charges to de-
termine their strength. 187 If the state agency finds the charge unsup-
ported by reasonable cause or sufficient evidence, it will not pursue 
the matter, 188 but if the agency finds the complaint reasonable, it will 
usually conduct a quasi-judicial evidentiary hearing. 189 
Federal courts should not give preclusive weight to findings ren-
dered after simple investigatory hearings. These findings typically 
result from a combination of investigation and conciliation in several 
informal meetings between an agency employee and the parties. 
These informal meetings ordinarily lack sworn testimony and cross-
examination, make no provision for subpoenaing witnesses, and do 
not require attendance of counsel. 19~ Respondents, usually private 
business concerns, may send counsel to submit exculpatory evidence 
and advance their interests.191 An inexperienced complainant, how-
ever, normally is not prepared to make an equivalent presentation. 
Informal investigatory proceedings serve a valuable function by 
weeding out patently frivolous claims and furnishing satisfactory re-
184. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 49, 57-58 (1974). 
185. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 537 F.2d at 73-74; United States v. 
School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 1141, 1150 n.6 (E.D. Mich. 1975). But see Fleer Corp. v. Topps 
Chewing Gum, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 176, 184 & n.9 (E.D. Pa. 1976). 
186. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 57-58 (1974) (absence of 
discovery one factor in not giving res judicata effect to arbitration proceeding); Smouse v. 
General Elec. Co., 626 F.2d 333, 335 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Groom v. Kawasaki Motors 
Corp., 344 F. Supp. at 1002 (W.D. Okla. 1972). It is doubtful whether the denial or limitation 
of discovery procedures alone is sufficient to negate application of preclusion principles. 
Where the amount involved does not warrant extensive pretrial proceedings, for example, 
cases are often tried with little or no discovery without creating a perception of unfairness. 
Most state employment discrimination statutes provide at least some forms of discovery, even 
at the administrative determination stage. Illinois, for example, allows for interrogatories and 
document requests, but limits access to depositions. ILL. HUMAN RIGHTS CoMMN, R. 
PRAC. & Paoc. § 7, 3 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) ~ 22,475.07. For examples of the kinds of 
discovery procedures available in state proceedings, see note 110 supra. 
187. See note 8 supra. 
188. E.g., CAL. GOVT. CODE§ 12971 (Deering Supp. 1981); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, t 7-
102(0) (Supp. 1980); N.Y. EXEC. LAW§ 297(2) (McKinney Supp. 1980); Omo REV, CODE 
ANN.§ 4112.05 (Page 1980). See note 8 supra. 
189. CAL. GOVT. CODE§§ 12967-69 (Deering Supp. 1981); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, t 8-106 
(Supp. 1980); MICH. STAT. ANN.§ 3.548(602) (1977); N.Y. Exec. LAW§§ 294 & 295 (McKin-
ney 1972 & Supp. 1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.05 (Page 1980). 
190. See, e.g., N.Y. Exec. LAW§ 297 (McKinney 1972). For a description of New York's 
procedures, see Mitchell v. NBC, 553 F.2d 265, 270 (2d Cir. 1977). See also Witherspoon, 
supra note 124, at 1197. 
191. See, e.g., Mitchell v. NBC, 553 F.2d at 267. 
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lief without expensive litigation. But these proceedings do not afford 
complainants a full and fair opportunity to litigate, and, therefore, 
cannot support application of res judicata or collateral estoppel. 192 
This conception of the full and fair opportunity requirement con-
flicts with the Second Circuit's view. In Sinicropi v. Nassau 
County 193 and Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 194 the Second 
Circuit granted res judicata effect to an investigatory determination 
of no probable cause that had been reviewed by a state court. Both 
opinions relied on Mitchell v. NBC, 195 a section 1981 case. The 
Mitchell court equated an administrative finding of no probable 
cause with a judicial ruling on a motion for summary judgment, 196 
and concluded that the lack of "a formal evidentiary hearing is no 
bar to the application of res judicata principles."197 The Mitchell 
court's equation is generally suspect, 198 and it is especially dubious 
in title VII cases. Federal courts routinely hold that the EEOC's in-
192. See, e.g., Pearson v. Williams, 202 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1906) (immigration board deter-
mination with no power to call witnesses or gather evidence). Cf. Trovillion v. King's Daugh-
ters Hosp., 614 F.2d 520, 523-25 (5th Cir. 1980) (dismissal of EEOC suit for failure to meet 
procedural prerequisites no bar to private action). See generally Parker, Administrative Res 
Judicata, 40 ILL. L. REV. 56 (1945); Schopflocher, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Administra-
tive Law, 1942 Wis. L. REv. 5; Developments, S11pra note 35, at 865-74. 
193. 601 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam). 
194. 623 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, IOI S. Ct. 3107 (1981) (No. 80-6045). 
195. 553 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1977). 
196. 553 F.2d at 270-71. 
197. 553 F.2d at 271. 
198. The New York nondiscrimination statute in Mitchell, for example, allows the fair 
employment agency to dismiss a complaint on grounds of "administrative convenience" as 
well as lack of probable cause. N.Y. EXEC. LAW§ 297(3)(c) (McKinney 1972). It seems likely 
that the agency's decisions regarding probable cause are affected by the resources the agency 
has at its disposal. With fixed resources, the agency can conduct a fixed number of evidentiary 
hearings and conciliation sessions. See Bonfield, An Institutional Analysis of the Agencies Ad-
ministering Fair Employment Practice Laws (Part II}, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1035, 1049 (1967) 
("Most co=entators agree that budgetary limitations are currently one of the greatest single 
factors responsible for deficiencies in the civil rights commission administration of fair em-
ployment laws"). Rather than expressly dismissing complaints due to considerations of ad-
ministrative convenience, the agency might subtly impose a higher standard of probable cause. 
See Girard & Jaffe, Some General Observations on Administration of State Fair Employment 
Practice Laws, 14 BUFFALO L. REv. 114, 118 (1964) ("From commission dismissal of about 
one-half of the complaints filed with them for lack of probable cause and from other evidence, 
one gets the strong impression that commissions have required too rigorous a showing of dis-
crimination"); cf. Harvard Note, note I24StJpra at 538 (1961) ("What 'probable cause' means 
is not at all clear, even among [state] commissioners and staff''). Because of the informality of 
the state determination and the deferential standard of review, state courts are not likely to 
detect and remedy use of a more demanding standard. In contrast, courts cannot vary sum-
mary judgment standards according to budgetary needs. The court must respond in a formal 
written opinion to the written contentions of the parties, basing its decision strictly on the 
merits. 
Relatedly, an administrative agency, unlike a court, usually makes its probable cause deter-
mination without the benefit of a factual record or formal legal argument generated by the 
complainant's counsel. It seems unrealistic to believe that this difference has no effect on the 
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vestigatory "reasonable cause" determinations are admissable, but 
not controlling. 199 It is difficult to comprehend why a similar state 
determination deserves preclusive weight; no evidence that Congress 
endorsed such an arbitrary rule exists. Rather, Congress's decision 
not to bind complainants to the EEOC's investigatory findings sug-
gests that complainants were meant to receive a more formal oppor-
tunity to present their cases. Even state court review of investigatory 
findings does not furnish such an opportunity. Although federal 
courts accord the EEOC's investigatory decisions appropriate 
weight, they nevertheless render de novo decisions. But state courts 
typically may decide only whether substantial evidence supports the 
administrative determination.200 Consequently, even if reviewed by 
a state court, purely investigatory determinations by state agencies 
should not be entitled to preclusive effect. 
State decisions rendered after full-blown evidentiary hearings, 
however, should ordinarily receive preclusive weight in federal 
courts. After a state agency determines that reasonable cause exists, 
state proceedings usually progress to an administrative evidentiary 
hearing. These hearings provide the adversarial procedural protec-
tions that are characteristically absent during the investigatory 
stage.201 Except where such safeguards are lacking, federal courts 
should give preclusive effect to these more formal administrative 
determinations. 
C. Unreviewed Administrative Determinations 
Although a superficial reading of section 1738 might suggest 
fairness and accuracy of the agency's determination. See also note 191 supra and accompany-
ing text. 
The differences between an agency's probable cause and a court's summary judgment de-
termination raise serious doubts about whether the agency is acting in a truly ''.judicial capac-
ity." See generally, Davis, Case Commentary: Withrow v. Larkin and the ''Separation of 
Functions" Concept in State Administratrive Proceedings, 27 AD. L. REV. 407 (1975); Davis, 
Judicialization of Administrative Law: The Trial-Type Hearing and the Changing Status of the 
Hearing Officer, 1977 DuKE LJ. 389; Gladstone, The Adjudicative Process in Administratil'e 
Law, 31 Ao. L. REv. 237 (1979); Parker,Administrative Res Judicata, 40 ILL. L. REV. 56 (1945); 
Schopfl.ocher, The JJoctrine of Res Judicata in Administrative Law, 1942 Wis. L. REV. 5; JJevel-
opments, supra note 35, at 865-74. 
199. See note 12 supra. 
200. See note 11 supra. In both Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 623 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 
1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 3107 (1981) (No. 80-6045), and in Sinicropi v. Nassau County, 
601 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 983 (1979), no evidentiary hear-
ing was conducted, nor was cross-examination permitted. In both, the New York Human 
Rights Division's informal investigatory determination was reviewed under a "substantial evi-
dence" standard when the complainant subsequently appealed to the New York courts. N.Y. 
EXEC. LAW§§ 297 & 298 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1980). 
201. See note 8 supra. 
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otherwise, the more reasonable view is that the section applies to 
final unreviewed administrative decisions rendered in a judicial ca-
pacity. Both the full faith and credit clause and section 1738, by 
their terms, apply only to 'Judicial proceedings."202 Although a 
reading of this language that excludes administrative decisions is 
tenable, the purposes of section 1738, accepted rules of res judicata, 
and the case law all point to a broader construction. To decide 
whether certain types of hearings are 'Judicial proceedings," courts 
should ignore the label affixed to the deciding tribunal, and evaluate 
the actual nature of the proceedings. 
In United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co. ,203 the 
Supreme Court held that, so long as opposing parties had an ade-
quate opportunity to litigate disputed issues of fact, res judicata is 
properly applied to decisions of an administrative agency acting in a 
'Judicial capacity."204 The narrow issue in Utah Construction con-
cerned the effect that a federal court must give to federal administra-
tive adjudications. This reasoning applies with equal force to state 
administrative adjudications.205 The full faith and credit clause and 
section 1738 require application of preclusion principles to unre-
viewed State administrative adjudications.206 
The Second Circuit refuses to grant preclusive effect to purely 
administrative decisions, even if the administrative agency employed 
formal, adversarial procedures.207 It will, however, apply preclusion 
doctrines to state administrative decisions if the complainant has ini-
tiated state court review of those decisions.208 This formalistic dis-
202. U.S. CONST. art. 4, § l; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 {1976). 
203. 384 U.S. 394 (1966). 
204. 384 U.S. at 422. 
205. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 443 (1943). 
206. JnMagno/ia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, the Supreme Court so held in reviewing the effect 
of an unreviewed administrative proceeding of one state in another: 
Whether the proceeding before the State Jndustrial Accident Board in Texas be re-
garded as a ''.judicial proceeding," or its award is a "record" within the meaning of the full 
faith and credit clause and the Act of Congress, the result is the same. For judicial pro-
ceedings and records of the state are both required to have "such faith and credit given to 
them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of 
the State from which they are taken. 
320 U.S. at 443. 
207. The Second Circuit has not directly held that an unreviewed state administrative deci-
sion is not entitled to res judicata effect. Language in its opinions, however, strongly suggests 
that it will not grant administrative determinations preclusive effect. In Sinicropi, the court 
stated: "The crucial factor is that the appellant chose to submit her case to the state courts for 
review and she cannot now relitigate the same issues in federal court." 602 F.2d at 62 (empha-
sis in original) (citing Mitchell v. NBC, 553 F.2d at 275-76). But see Mitchell v. NBC, 553 F.2d 
at 273 & n.10 (discussing whether the New York legislature intended that unreviewed deci-
sions of the Civil Rights Commission stand as "final"). 
208. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 623 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 
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tinction between reviewed and unreviewed administrative decisions 
misconstrues title VII's intent, section 1738, and traditional preclu-
sion principles. 
Judicial review of an administrative adjudication, a process that 
adds little to the procedural fairness or substantive adequacy of the 
original decision, does not magically trigger application of section 
1738's policies of comity and efficiency: These policies apply equally 
well to an unreviewed decision of an administrative agency acting in 
a judicial capacity. After Utah Construction, there is no dispute in 
state courts209 or federal courts210 that preclusion doctrines apply to 
unreviewed administrative adjudications, and that they must be 
given full faith and credit.211 
The Second Circuit's position not to accord preclusive effect 
must, therefore, be supported by a clearly expressed legislative in-
tent.212 The evidence that the circuit has mustered in support of its 
position cannot withstand careful analysis. In Mitchell and Sin-
icropi, the Second Circuit intimated that restricting res judicata to 
administrative decisions that we_re judicially approved at the com-
plainant's request might be necessary to preserve his right to choose 
a federal forum.213 If unreviewed state administrative decisions can 
have res judicata effect, title VII's deferral provision, which requires 
complainants to submit their claims first to state administrative 
agencies, will prevent them from choosing to litigate in a federal fo-
rum. Although Sinicropi suggests that complainants were meant to 
have such a choice, nothing in title VII's legislative history supports 
that assertion. As we have seen, Congress provided access to the 
federal courts not to guarantee complainants their choice of forums, 
but to ensure the adequacy of state decisions.214 
S. Ct. 3107 (1981) (No. 80-6045); Sinicropi v. Nassau County, 601 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 983 (1979). The Second Circuit has hinted that preclusive effect should not 
attach where the defendant has sought judicial review. See note 213 infra and accompanying 
text. 
209. See, e.g., Superior's Brand Meats, Inc. v. Lindley, 62 Ohio St. 2d 133, 403 N.E.2d 996 
(1980); Schmidt v. Zellmer, 298 N.W.2d 178 (S.D. 1980). 
210. See, e.g., McCullough Interstate Gas Corp. v. FPC, 536 F.2d 910 (10th Cir. 1976); 
Roberts v. American Airlines, 526 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1975); Safir v. Gibson, 432 F.2d 137 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970). 
211. See, e.g., Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 100 S. Ct 2647 (1980); Industrial 
Commn. v. Mccartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 441 
(1943); Nagle v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 349 
(S.D. Tex. 1974); Trautman v. Standard Oil Co., 263 N.W.2d 809 (Minn. 1978). But see Note, 
Res Judicata in Successive Employment Discrimination Suits, 1980 U. ILL, L.F. 1049, 1100. 
212. See Part I supra. 
213. 601 F.2d at 62; 553 F.2d at 275 n.13. See Case Comment, 12 SUFFOLK L. REV. 139, 
147-48 (1978). 
214. See Part II. A supra. 
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Instead of implementing title VII's intent, the Second Circuit's 
preclusion doctrine frustrates important congressional goals. Be-
cause the Second Circuit's position rests the preclusion issue on state 
court review rather than on substantive adequacy and procedural 
fairness, it is both under-inclusive and over-inclusive. The approach 
is over-inclusive because it allows investigatory determinations of 
state agencies, unlike the EEOC's findings, to bind federal courts. It 
is under-inclusive because a complainant's decision not to seek state 
judicial review allows a federal court to overturn a procedurally fair 
and substantively sufficient state administrative decision. In con-
trast, this Article's preclusion doctrine directly addresses Congress's 
concerns. Far from overriding section 1738's presumptive applica-
bility, an examination of title VIl's intent strengthens the conclusion 
that federal courts should give preclusive effect to procedurally fair 
unreviewed state administrative decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
InAllen v. Mccurry, the Supreme Court rejected the "generally 
framed principle that every person asserting a federal right is entitled 
to one unencumbered opportunity to litigate that right in a federal 
district court . . . ."215 Courts can no longer rely on vaguely sup-
ported general principles, but must look instead to Congress's intent 
to determine whether a complainant is entitled to a de novo trial in 
federal court after a state tribunal has adjudicated the claim. Allen's 
message is that only a clearly expressed legislative intent to permit 
relitigation can justify the "implied repeal" of section 173 8, a federal 
statute that requires federal courts to give res judicata and collateral 
estoppel effect to state decisions. · 
The available evidence does not demonstrate an affirmative in-
tent to supplant preclusion rules. Instead, it gives courts strong rea-
sons to believe that title VII is fully compatible with, and even 
compels, the use of preclusion doctrines. In holding that state deci-
sions deserve only substantial weight, most circuit courts have drawn 
unconvincing inferences from title VII's structure, the 1972 "substan-
tial weight" amendment, and the Supreme Court's decision in Alex-
ander v. Gardner-Denver Co. Surprisingly, they have virtually 
ignored the most direct and illuminating evidence of Congress's in-
tent - the 1964 Act's legislative history. These legislative materials 
reveal that Congress wished to defer to state authorities whenever 
such deference would not undermine the substantive adequacy and 
215. 101 S. Ct. at 419. 
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procedural fairness of employment discrimination decisions. Con-
gress concluded that one method - granting the states primary juris-
diction, but permitting access to federal courts for supplemental 
relief-_ would best reconcile title VIl's conflicting objectives. 
Unfortunately, the circuit courts have misconstrued the guaran-
tee of access to the federal courts. By interpreting access to imply a 
right to a de novo relitigation, most circuit courts have undercut the 
policies of respect for and deference to adequate state decisions. The 
Second Circuit's application of preclusion principles has also dis-
torted title Vll's intended operation. Because the Second Circuit's 
rule turns on whether a state court reviewed an agency's decision, the 
court may uphold procedurally unfair decisions while discarding 
fully and fairly litigated decisions. This Article's preclusion doc-
trine, which is based explicitly on title VII's federal/state policies of 
comity and efficiency, strikes the proper balance between deference 
to state jurisdiction and fidelity to the rights guaranteed by title VII. 
